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I. Introduction
In October 1994, Congress enacted the most recent amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (the "Code").' The
amendments include provisions raising the debt limits for Chapter
13 eligibility, increasing exemption amounts and adding to the
existing categories of priorities and non-dischargeable debts.2
However, one question often litigated under the Code remains
unresolved: that of the status of installment contracts for the
purchase of real estate when the buyer files for bankruptcy. This
article seeks to show that such contracts, commonly known as
installment land contracts, should be treated in bankruptcy like
their functional equivalents-purchase-money mortgages.
A. The Hypothetical Debtor
Buyer wants to purchase a piece of real estate. Buyer,
however, is having trouble finding conventional financing in the
form of a mortgage loan from a bank, perhaps because Buyer does
not have a sufficient downpayment. As a result, Buyer asks a
potential seller if Seller would be willing to finance the purchase
price of the property.
At this point, the Seller willing to finance the purchase has two
options. Seller can either take back a promissory note secured by
a purchase-money mortgage, or Seller can offer an installment land
contract. Either device will likely carry a higher interest rate than
the institutional mortgage loan, because Buyer is something of a
credit risk. If Seller elects to use a purchase-money mortgage,
Seller conveys title to the property to Buyer and retains only a
security interest in the land. Buyer takes possession and becomes
the owner of the land, subject to the lien of seller. If, however,
Seller enters into an installment land contract, Seller keeps title to
the property until the Buyer pays the entire purchase price.3
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394,108 Stat. 4106,4111-12 (1994).
3. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 3.26 (3d
ed. 1994)[hereinafter NELSON & WHITMAN TREATISE]. Such an arrangement is sometimes
known as a contract for deed, a long term land contract or a land sale contract. It is
important to distinguish these types of contracts from the ordinary executory contract for the
sale of land, which is used primarily to establish the rights and liabilities of the buyer and
seller between the date of their bargain and the date of closing, which is usually only a
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Normally, during the contract period, the Buyer will be required to
pay property taxes, maintain casualty insurance, and keep the
property in good repair. Buyer also takes possession of the land,
but is not considered the owner since Seller retains title.
The installment land contract solution has benefits for both
Buyer and Seller. Buyer gets to take possession of the land
without a large downpayment, and without the large closing costs
customarily associated with institutional financing. Seller, on the
other hand, sells land that may have been difficult to sell, receives
a relatively .high interest rate, and receives more favorable tax
treatment than if the transaction were a cash sale.4 In addition,
the Seller, in some states, has the remedy of forfeiture.' It is the
remedy of forfeiture which makes the installment land contract
more favorable, from Seller's perspective, than the seller-financed
purchase-money mortgage. Traditionally, buyers under installment
land contracts have not received the protections afforded to
mortgagors of real property upon default.6 In many states, a seller,
upon default by the buyer, can exercise the right of forfeiture. If
the land is located in such a state, the Seller can remove Buyer
from the land without following mortgage foreclosure rules. If the
Seller exercises this right, Buyer loses all interest in the land and
all payments made on the contract.7
month or two later. Id. § 3.26, at 68-69. See also 7 POWELL, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY,
938.20 (Rohan ed. 1995), for a general discussion of the installment land contract. It is not
considered a lease arrangement. Id.
4. See 26 U.S.C. § 453 (1994). See also NELSON & WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note
3. § 3.34, at 106-11.
5. The forfeiture remedy is a major disadvantage to the buyer. On the part of the
buyer, the choice to enter into an installment land contract often is not a choice at all. If the
buyer is a good credit risk for an institutional lender, it would be preferable for the buyer
to get a mortgage loan from such a lender. One court termed the installment land contract
the "poor man's mortgage." Ellis v. Butterfield, 570 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Idaho 1977).
Advocates of the approach that treats installment land contracts according to state-law
characterizations believe the option between a mortgage and a installment land contract is
a true choice. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 321 (1989).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 24-33.
7. Many states have taken legislative steps to mitigate the harshness of forfeiture for
the buyer. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3275,3369 (West 1970); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 656.1-
656.6 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); MD. CODE. ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 10-101 to 10-108 (1988
& Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.21 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 28-1-104 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-18-01 to 32-18-06 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
16, § l1(A) (West 1986). For related discussion of statutory limitations on forfeiture, see
NELSON & WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, § 3.28, at 70-74; Donna R. Roper, Comment,
Forfeiture Clauses in Land Installment Contracts: Time for Equitable Foreclosure, 8 U. PUGET
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B. The Problem
Although the installment land contract is widely considered to
be the functional equivalent of a purchase-money mortgage,8 its
treatment as such is not clear when the buyer files for bankruptcy.
The Code is silent as to whether installment land contracts should
be treated as the functional equivalent of purchase-money mortgag-
es in the event of the buyer's bankruptcy. The Code, however,
does provide for special treatment of installment land contracts
when the seller is a debtor in bankruptcy. In such a case, if the
trustee in bankruptcy rejects the contract, the Code provides the
buyer with an option. The Buyer can either declare the contract
terminated, or the buyer may remain in possession, make all
payments, and receive the deed to the property from the trustee.9
The question of whether the installment land contract is an
executory contract or a mortgage is crucial in the buyer's bankrupt-
cy because the two are treated very differently under the Code.1"
For the reasons explained below, sellers usually prefer that an
installment land contract be treated as an executory contract. As
SOUND L. REV. 85 (1984).
8. NELSON & WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, § 1.7.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i) provides:
(1) If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the debtor for the sale of
real property or for the sale of a timeshare interest under a timeshare plan, under
which the purchaser is in possession, such purchaser may treat such contract as
terminated, or, in the alternative, may remain in possession of such real property
or timeshare interest.
(2) If such purchaser remains in possession-
(A) such purchaser shall continue to make all payments due under
such contract, but may, offset against such payments any damages occurring
after the date of the rejection of such contract caused by the nonperformance
of any obligation of the debtor after such date, but such purchaser does not
have any rights against the estate on account of any damages arising after
such date from such rejection, other than such offset; and
(B) the trustee shall deliver title to such purchaser in accordance with
the provisions of such contract, but is relieved of all other obligations to
perform under such contract.
11 U.S.C. § 365(i) (1994). Section 365(i) was included in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 as one of the "several safeguards for the protection of nonbankrupt parties to leases
and sales contracts involving real estate." BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK,
BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 7.10[10] (3d ed. 1993). As the legislative history suggests,
365(i) was designed to protect the non-debtor purchaser of real property under a land
installment sales contract. S. REP. NO. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 60, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5846 and H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 349, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6306.
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 502, 1129(b), 1325(a)(5) (1994).
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a result, when the buyer files for bankruptcy, the seller will often
move to compel the buyer to assume or reject the contract.11
If the buyer is considered a mortgagor, the buyer, when a
bankruptcy petition is filed under Chapters 11, 12 or 13, can deal
with the mortgage in his plan of reorganization.1 2 Under the
Code a debtor may modify the rights of secured creditors. 3 As
a result, the debtor is permitted to pay, over the period of the plan,
the value of the mortgagee's secured claim. 4 On the other hand,
if the buyer is in possession under an installment land contract
deemed to be an executory contract, the debtor must assume the
contract in full in order to retain the land.15 As a result, he must
perform the contract according to its original terms, without any
modification of amount owing or interest rate.16 In addition, if the
buyer/debtor has defaulted on the contract, he must either cure the
defaults or provide adequate assurance of cure in order to assume
the contract. If the debtor rejects the contract, the seller gets the
land back. 7
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d). See, e.g., In re Redpath Computer Services, Inc., 181 B.R.
975 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1995); In re Steffen, 181 B.R. 981 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1995); Firearms
Import and Export Corp. v. United Capitol Ins. Co. (In re Firearms Import and Export
Corp.), 131 B.R. 1009 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991); In re Seabrook Island Ocean Club, Inc., 118
B.R. 410 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1990). See also NELSON & WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3,
§ 8.19, at 692-94, for a discussion of vendor and vendee remedies within the context of
installment land contracts.
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1222(b)(2), 1322(b)(2), (1994).
13. Id.
14. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123 (b)(5), 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(Il), 1222(b)(2), 1225(a)(5), 1322(b)(2),
1325(a)(5) (1994). In Chapter 13, a plan only lasts three years (five with court approval).
If the mortgage is for a longer term than three years, the debtor may provide for a longer
payment period. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
Should the loan be secured solely by a lien on the debtor's personal residence, the
debtor would not be allowed to modify the mortgagee's rights under the mortgage
documents. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1322(b)(2) provide that a debtor's plan of reorgani-
zation cannot modify the rights of a holder of a claim secured only by a lien on the debtor's
personal residence. Since a home mortgage cannot be modified, this article does not discuss
home mortgages.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 365. In re Patch Graphics, 32 B.R. 373, 375 (Bankr. W.D. Wis 1983),
In re Cox, 28 B.R. 588, 589 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983), In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 60 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982).
17. In re Rancho Chamberino, 77 B.R. 555, 560 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987). The court
in Fox v. Hill (In re Fox), relying on Pennsylvania law, stated in dicta that a purchaser could
remain in possession of the land during the pendency of the bankruptcy case because upon
termination of the contract, the buyer would become a tenant and the seller would only be
entitled to relief from stay if the buyer/tenant ceased making fair rental payments. However,
rejection of the contract would effect a breach, and the debtor would lose all of his equity
[100:4
INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY
Courts have encountered difficulty in determining how to
decide the issue of whether an installment land contract should be
treated as a mortgage or a contract subject to the provisions of
§ 365 of the Code. Some courts have looked to state law to resolve
the issue. 8  Others have looked to the definition of executory
contract,19 while still others have imposed some standard of
fairness upon either the buyer or the seller.2 Lacking uniformity,
these varying approaches inexorably lead to inconsistency from
state to state 1 and sometimes even within a state.22 As a result,
it is difficult for parties to predict, at the outset of their transaction,
how an installment land contract will be treated for bankruptcy
purposes.
This article will examine the treatment of installment land
contracts in bankruptcy cases and propose that such contracts be
treated as mortgages. In proposing solutions to the problem of
installment land contracts in bankruptcy, it is necessary to examine
the position of sellers under installment land contracts and
purchase-money mortgagees outside of bankruptcy in order to
determine whether there is any compelling reason to treat them
differently in bankruptcy.'
II. Remedies and Rights Under Installment Land Contracts and
Mortgages
The two most important differences between installment land
contracts and purchase-money mortgages outside of bankruptcy are
the location of title and the seller's available remedies. To
appreciate the anomalous nature of installment land contracts it is
necessary to examine the remedies available under both installment
land contracts and mortgages, as well as the history of mortgage
remedies.
in the property. 83 B.R. 290, 300 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 134-55.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 156-77.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 178-204.
21. See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
23. One of the frequently stated goals of the Bankruptcy Code is the equal treatment
of similarly situated creditors. See THERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL, As WE FORGIVE OUR
DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 276-77 (1989).
1996]
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A. The Forfeiture Remedy- The Installment Land Contract's
Defining Feature
The buyer's incentive for entering into an installment contract
is clear-it gives the buyer the opportunity to occupy the property
without paying the large downpayment commonly associated with
institutional financing.24 The seller also has a clear incentive-the
availability of forfeiture. The forfeiture clause, common in
installment land contracts, allows the seller to declare the contract
terminated, retain all payments as liquidated damages, and retake
possession of the premises without legal process upon the buyer's
default.25  Consequently, the buyer forfeits any equity in the
property which may have been built during possession. This clause
renders the installment land contract, from the seller's point of
view, more favorable than a mortgage or deed of trust, since under
both of those instruments, a mortgagee must foreclose the
mortgagor's equity of redemption in order to retake possession of
the real property.26  While the seller under an installment land
contract also has the right to sue for the overdue installments,
specific performance of the contract, damages from the breach or
foreclosure of the buyer's rights, sellers most frequently elect use
of the forfeiture remedy.
27
It is important to note that default rates under installment land
contracts are higher than default rates for mortgages, because the
installment financing device tends to be used by lower income
buyers who cannot qualify for conventional financing.28 As a
24. Often a seller, extending credit by taking back a purchase money mortgage, will
accept a lower downpayment than an institutional lender. Therefore, the choice between
using an installment land contract and using a purchase-money mortgage rests primarily with
the seller.
25. NELSON AND WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, § 3.26, at 68-69. The availability
of forfeiture has been diminished in several states. See notes 34-46 infra and accompanying
text.
26. The procedure which the mortgagee must follow differs from state to state. In a
small minority of states, strict foreclosure is permitted. In others, foreclosure is by judicial
sale or by a power of sale contained in the mortgage instrument. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 51-60.
27. Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, The Installment Land Contract-A National
Viewpoint, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 541, 542.
28. BAXTER F. DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 10.02[1] (Clark
Boardman Callaghan, 1995).
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result, the very people who would not be able to afford a home,29
small business premises, or a farm without the installment land
contract are the ones who stand to lose not only their real property,
but also all equity in that real property."
Many have argued that abolition of the forfeiture remedy
would end the use of the installment land contract as a financing
device.3" By extension, some have argued that treating an install-
ment land contract as a mortgage for bankruptcy purposes would
have the same effect.32 However, the treatment of installment
land contracts as mortgages for bankruptcy purposes would not, in
itself, eliminate the remedy of forfeiture. Rather, it would delay
the remedy, just as creditor remedies under mortgages and deeds
of trusts are delayed by the automatic stay.
33
B. Chipping Away at the Forfeiture Remedy
Various states have, by statute, attempted to make the remedy
of forfeiture less severe. State law varies greatly as to how a seller
can regain the land after a buyer default. Iowa34  and
Minnesota,35 for example, provide grace periods before allowing
use of the forfeiture remedy. Under these statutes, the seller
29. This article does not address residential installment land contracts, because under
§§ 1123(b)(5) and 1322(b)(2), a debtor must pay a home mortgage debt in full under a plan
of reorganization. This applies only to claims secured by a lien on real property that is the
debtor's residence. See supra note 14.
30. In reality, mortgagors rarely recover any equity in a foreclosure sale, because
foreclosure sales rarely bring the fair market value of the realty. However, the foreclosure
mechanism, at least in theory, allows the value of the property to be tested at a sale.
31. See, e.g., Thomas Leo McKeirnan, Preserving Real Estate Contract Financing in
Washington: Resisting the Pressure to Eliminate Forfeiture, 70 WASH. L. REV. 227,246 (1995);
Eric T. Freyfogle, Vagueness and The Rule of Law: Reconsidering Installment Land Contract
Forfeitures, 1988 DUKE L.J. 609; James Geoffrey Durham, Forfeiture of Residential Land
Contracts in Ohio: The Need for Further Reform of a Reform Statute, 16 AKRON L. REV. 397
(1983). This article will not address the question of whether installment land contracts
should be universally abolished.
32. This argument is implicit in In re Speck, in which the court, in holding that an
installment land contract is an executory contract subject to § 365, stressed that "[t]he
contract for deed is one of the few alternatives to commercial financing available, and it is
especially well suited to the realities of agricultural land sales." 50 B.R. 307, 308 (Bankr.
D.S.D. 1985).
33. The automatic stay provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362 prohibits any action to obtain
property of the estate or property of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). As a result, a
mortgagee cannot foreclose the mortgagor's interest in the property unless the mortgagee
obtains relief from the stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994).
34. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 656.1-656.6 (West 1987).
35. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.21 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
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cannot evict the buyer from the property until the seller gives the
buyer notice and an opportunity to cure.36 Maryland has prohibit-
ed forfeiture in all cases in which the buyer is a consumer.37
Oklahoma has, by statute, effectively rendered the installment land
contract obsolete by requiring installment land contracts to be
foreclosed in the same manner as mortgages.
38
In other states, the courts, rather than the legislatures, have
lessened the impact of the remedy of forfeiture.39 In these
decisions, the courts have applied a confusing mixture of contract
law and mortgage law principles.' Florida courts, applying
mortgage law principles, have given installment land contract
buyers an equity of redemption.41 Kansas courts have also applied
mortgage principles in giving buyers a post-foreclosure right of
redemption.42 Indiana courts generally prohibit forfeiture,43 but
will allow it when the buyer has paid only a small portion of the
contract price.44 In Utah, courts applying the contract principle of
unjust enrichment have held that buyers are entitled to a return of
a portion of the purchase price that they have already paid, usually
36. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 656.2, 656.4; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.21.
37. In Maryland there is no forfeiture in contracts for the sale of real property where
the buyer is an individual. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 10-101 to 10-108 (1988 & Supp.
1994). Ohio and Illinois also make a distinction between residential and commercial
property in their installment land contract statutes. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.05,
5313.06, 5313.08 (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 735, para. 5/15-1106 (Smith-Hurd 1994).
38. OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11(A) (West 1986). For a general discussion of statutory
limitations on forfeiture, see Grant S. Nelson and Dale A. Whitman, Installment Land
Contracts-The National Scene Revisited, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-11.
39. Kentucky, for example, relies on the doctrine of equitable conversion. See, e.g.,
Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Ky. 1979).
40. Compare H.L. Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. App. 1972) with Soffe v.
Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983).
41. H.L. Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. App. 1972)(holding that "an
installment land sale contract is in essence a mortgage, and.. . the safeguards for the debtor
and the remedies for the creditor are the same as those between a mortgagor and
mortgagee"). The court in H.L. Land limited its holding to contracts under which the buyer
has possession or other "burdens and benefits of ownership." Id. For a discussion of the
equity if redemption and its importance in mortgage law, see infra notes 54-65 and
accompanying text.
42. Nelson v. Robinson, 336 P.2d 415 (Kan. 1959)(court deemed installment land
contract to be an equitable mortgage and granted the buyers a six month redemption
period).
43. Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641 (Ind. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974).
44. Phillips v. Nay, 456 N.E.2d 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
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to the extent that such portion exceeds the fair rental value of the
land.45
As a result of the above legislative and judicial responses to
forfeiture, the differences between installment land contracts and
purchase-money mortgages are disappearing.46
C. The Right of Redemption-The Mortgage's Defining Feature
Under early English common law, a mortgage was essentially
a conveyance of fee simple ownership from the debtor to the
creditor.47 The conveyance, however, was on condition subse-
quent, that is, if the debtor paid the creditor in full on the payment
date, or "law day," then the debtor could reenter the land and
terminate the creditor's estate.48
Over the years, however, the debtor's equity of redemption
developed. When a mortgagor defaults on his mortgage, the
mortgagor has the right to pay the entire amount of the outstand-
ing debt and receive the legal interest in the property.49 This is
called the mortgagor's "equity of redemption." Although a
mortgagor and mortgagee can agree that the mortgagor will
relinquish the right of redemption by, for instance, the mortgagor
giving a deed in lieu of foreclosure, the agreement cannot be made
in the mortgage instrument itself.
50
In order to obtain title to the real property, a mortgagee must
act to foreclose this "equity of redemption." There are three main
types of foreclosure in the United States, although only two are
generally viable.51 The rarest type of foreclosure is strict foreclo-
sure.52 In states that permit strict foreclosure, the mortgagee must
45. See, e.g., Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983)(awarding buyers on counterclaim
a return of that portion of the total payments they had made in excess of the fair rental value
of the premises during their occupancy); Young v. Hansen 218 P.2d 666 (Utah 1950)(recover-
ing excess payments under theory of unjust enrichment). But see Bellon v. Malnar 808 P.2d
1089 (Utah 1991)(allowing interest on contract as an alternative to fair rental value).
46. For a general discussion of judicial limitations on the forfeiture remedy, see, Nelson
and Whitman, supra note 38, at 11-31.
47. NELSON AND WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, § 1.2.
48. Id.
49. For a related discussion of mortgagors' rights among selected jurisdictions, see
NELSON AND WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, § 3.29, at 74-91.
50. Dorman v. Fisher, 155 A.2d 11, 13 (N.J. 1959).
51. ROBERT KRATOVIL & RAYMOND J. WERNER, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 41.08, 41.09, 41.11 (2d ed. 1981).
52. At the current time, strict foreclosure is utilized in only three states. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-15 (West 1995); 735 ILL. REV. STAT. ANN.. § 5/15-1403 (West 1995);
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bring a judicial action for foreclosure. 3 When the judgment of
foreclosure is granted, the mortgagee can take title to the property
without a sale.54
The two generally viable types of foreclosure are judicial
foreclosure55 and foreclosure by power of sale.56 In both types
the property is sold at a public sale under the theory that a public
sale is the best place to test the value of the property.57
In judicial foreclosure, the mortgagee must first obtain a
judgment of foreclosure, and then the ensuing sale is supervised by
the court.58 Power of sale foreclosure exists only where state law
permits it, and the power of sale is contained in the mortgage
instrument.59 No court action is involved, but the property must
be sold at a public sale.6°
Throughout history, parties who have financed the purchase of
land have tried to defeat, or "clog," the mortgagor's equity of
redemption. One way in which parties have tried to do this is by
having the buyer give the financier an absolute deed for the
property, which the financier would transfer to the buyer when all
sums owing were paid.6' Courts routinely view such attempts,
however, as disguised mortgages and give the buyer the equity of
redemption.
62
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4528, (1994). See generally NELSON & WHITMAN TREATISE, supra
note 3, § 7.10.
53. See NELSON & WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, § 7.10.
54. See, e.g., Crane v. Loomis, 25 A.2d 650, 651 (Conn. 1942); see also VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 4528.
55. Judicial foreclosure is exclusively or generally followed in 21 states. NELSON &
WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, § 7.11, n. 1, at 490-91.
56. Power of sale foreclosure is permitted in over thirty jurisdictions. Id. § 7.19, n. 1,
at 512.
57. Robert K. Lifton, Real Estate in Trouble: Lender's Remedies Need an Overhaul, 31
BUS. LAW 1927,1936 (1976); William C. Prather, Foreclosure of the Security Interest, 1957 U.
ILL. L. F. 420, 429.
58. KRATOVIL & WERNER, supra note 51, § 7.11, n. 1, at 490-91.
59. Id. § 7.19, n. 1, at 512.
60. Power of sale foreclosure is permitted in over thirty jurisdictions. NELSON &
WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, § 7.19, n. 1, at 512.
61. For a discussion of the deed absolute, see generally, Id. § 3.5; Roger A. Cunningham
& Saul Tischler, Disguised Real Estate Security Transactions as Mortgages in Substance, 26
RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1972). Some commentators have concluded that the installment land
contract is "virtually identical in form to the common law mortgage, the deed absolute."
Linda S. Hume, Real Estate Contracts and the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion in
Washington: Dispelling the Ashford Cloud, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 233, 245 (1984).
62. Hume, supra note 61, at 247.
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It is now well settled throughout the country that any absolute
conveyance of land which the parties intend as security for a debt
will be considered a mortgage and that mortgage law will be
applied.63 However, the maxim "once a mortgage, always a
mortgage"' has not traditionally applied to installment land
contracts.
65
In spite of policies favoring redemption, the installment land
contract has remained a viable device. In Miller v. Anderson,6 6
the court distinguished installment land contracts from deeds
absolute by stating that "[t]itle to the property involved in an
equitable mortgage starts with the borrower and passes to the
lender as security for money borrowed. [In an installment land
contract], title originated with ... the lender., 67 In distinguishing
installment land contracts from equitable mortgages, the court in
Miller stated it would consider a transaction to be an equitable
mortgage only when the parties intend to enter into a mortgage
relationship.68  The important inquiry, however, should not be
whether the parties intended a mortgage, because parties entering
into an installment land contract do not intend a mortgagor-
mortgagee relationship. Instead, the crucial inquiry should be
whether the parties intended that the deed to the realty stand as
security for a debt.69
63. Cunningham and Tischler, supra note 61, at 4. In determining whether an absolute
deed should be considered a mortgage, courts must consider extrinsic evidence. When there
is a writing obligating the grantee to reconvey the land, the party seeking to establish an
equitable mortgage must establish that the two writings constitute part of the same
transaction. Id. at 11-12. When there is no additional writing, courts tend to be lenient in
admitting parol evidence, because "[an allegation that the deed was given for security is
necessarily an allegation that the deed was not intended to embody the entire agreement of
the parties." Id. at 9.
64. Gavin v. Johnson, 41 A.2d 113, 117 (Conn. 1945).
65. Cunningham and Tischler, supra note 61, at 7. Called "[o]ne of the most important
aspects of the mortgage relationship ... [t]his maxim primarily applies to an agreement
embodied in or contemporaneous with the execution of the mortgage, and its purpose is to
protect the debtor who, under circumstances of hardship or necessity, might be an easy prey
to those who sought to exact inequitable conditions." Gavin, 41 A.2d at 117.
66. 394 N.W. 2d 279 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
67. Id. at 283.
68. Id.
69. Cunningham and Tischler, supra note 61, at 6.
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III. General Bankruptcy Principles
Since installment land contracts are essentially security devices,
the disparate treatment of purchase-money mortgages and
installment land contracts conflicts with two of the primary
objectives of bankruptcy: providing the debtor with a "fresh
start"7 and treating similarly situated creditors equally.7' Treat-
ing the installment land contract as a mortgage would better
encourage the debtor's reorganization efforts, because the debtor
could then deal with the contract under a plan of reorganization.
Therefore, in the absence of any compelling reason for treating
installment sellers differently from purchase-money mortgagees, it
seems that they should be treated alike, since both installment land
contracts and purchase-money mortgages constitute methods for
financing the purchase of real property.
Installment sellers and purchase-money mortgagees are
similarly situated. Both are entitled to full payment of their debt
outside of bankruptcy. If there is no default, both get paid the
purchase price of the land, plus interest. Outside of bankruptcy,
both would be entitled to the land upon- the buyer's default;
although the purchase-money mortgagee would be required to
follow foreclosure procedures. Both could sell the land to satisfy
the debt. Absent a compelling reason for allowing an installment
seller to be repaid in full in bankruptcy, regardless of the value of
the land, while an undersecured purchase-money mortgagee is
entitled only to the present value of the real property plus an
unsecured claim,72 the two devices should be treated alike for
bankruptcy purposes.
A debtor's fresh start is embodied in the discharge that a
debtor receives upon the successful completion of a bankruptcy
70. The fresh start for debtors lies "at the heart of all bankruptcy law." SULLIVAN ET
AL. supra note 23, at 20.
71. THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 10.02
(Warren, Gorham & Lamont 1991).
72. Section 506(a) states:
an allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate
has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's
interest in the estate's interest in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to
the extent that the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of
such allowed claim.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
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case.73 When a debtor files under Chapter 7, the debtor's proper-
ty is liquidated and applied to the debtor's prepetition debts. 4 To
the extent that the estate is not sufficient to pay the debts, the
debts are discharged.7" When a debtor files for bankruptcy under
one of the reorganization chapters, the debtor will pay a portion of
his prepetition debts according to his plan, and will emerge from
bankruptcy free from his remaining prepetition debts.
76
As the following section will explain, treatment of an install-
ment land contract as a security device is essential to the debtor's
fresh start. This result is best illustrated when the land subject to
the contract is worth less than the contract price. If the contract
were held subject to §365, the seller would be paid the full
purchase price.77 If the contract were considered a security
device, the seller would have two claims, an allowed secured claim
equal to the value of the property and an allowed unsecured claim
in the amount of the difference between the value of the property
and the contract price.78  The debtor then would be able to
discharge the portion of the purchase price that exceeded the value
of the collateral, and the debtor would be in the same position as
a purchase-money mortgagor and any other debtor whose property
is subject to a security interest.
A. Treatment of Executory Contracts Under the Bankruptcy
Code
Regardless of the similarities between mortgages and install-
ment land contracts, it is not clear that they will be treated in the
same manner under the Bankruptcy Code. Under the Code, the
trustee or debtor in possession can assume or reject executory
contracts. 79 As a result, the cases dealing with installment land
73. 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 727, 1141, 1228, 1328 (1994). In Chapter 7, a discharge is granted
after the estate property is liquidated and the creditors are paid. 11 U.S.C. § 727. A
Chapter 7 discharge is only available to a debtor who is an individual. 11 U.S.C. § 727. In
Chapters 12 and 13, the court grants the discharge after all plan payments are completed.
11 U.S.C. § 1228, 1328. In Chapter 11, the confirmation of the debtor's plan constitutes the
discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 1141.
74. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(1)(a), 726.
75. 11 U.S.C. § 727.
76. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1141(d)(1), 1228, 1328(a).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994). See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (a) (1994).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). For the remainder of this article, I will use the word "trustee"
to refer to both the trustee and the debtor in possession.
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contracts often start by addressing the question of whether or not
the contract at issue is "executory."
1. The Search for a Definition of "Executory." -The term
"executory contract" is not defined in the Code. Many courts,
however, point to the legislative history of the Code, which states
that the term "generally includes contracts on which performance
remains due to some extent on both sides., 80  Since "executory
contract" is not defined anywhere in the Code, courts have
interpreted the term, and thus the section, in a variety of ways.
One common definition of the term "executory contract" is the
"Countryman test." Professor Countryman defined an executory
contract as "a contract under which the obligation of both the
bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unper-
formed that the failure of either to complete performance would
constitute a material breach excusing performance by the other."'"
Professor Countryman contrasted executory contracts with
those fully performed by the non-bankrupt party. If a contract is
fully performed by the non-bankrupt party, the contract will give
that party a claim in the debtor's bankruptcy.82 Such contracts do
not fall within the assume or reject provisions of the Code because
[t]he estate has whatever benefit it can obtain from the other
party's performance and the trustee's rejection would neither
add to nor detract from the creditor's claim or the estate's
liability. .. . [The trustee's] assumption, on the other hand,
would in no way benefit the estate and would only have the
effect of converting the claim into a first priority expense of
administration and thus of preferring it over all claims not
assumed ... 8
Several commentators have found fault with "executoriness"
as a threshold requirement for the application of § 365. Professor
Westbrook advocates abolishing the requirement of "executoriness"
altogether,84 proposing instead a functional approach to contracts
in bankruptcy. Michael T. Andrew also criticizes executoriness
80. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5844.
81. Ven Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439,
460 (1973).
82. Id. at 451.
83. Id. at 451-52 (footnotes omitted).
84. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 230.
85. See infra notes 331-35 and accompanying text.
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as a threshold, stating that the definition of executory contract
serves no meaningful purpose in the rejection context, but is
necessary in the assumption context to distinguish between those
contracts which should be entitled to administrative priority and
those which should not.86
With all of the confusion surrounding the definition of
executory, it is necessary to examine the purposes and effects of
§ 365 to determine whether installment land contracts are among
the types of contracts to which § 365 should apply.
2. The Effect of Classifying a Contract as Executory. -If the
installment land contract is considered to be an executory contract,
and the debtor files under Chapters 11, 12 or 13, the trustee may
assume or reject the contract at any time before confirmation of
the plan.87 The court, however, on the request of any party to the
contract, may order the trustee to determine within a "specified
period of time" whether to assume or reject the contract.8
Generally, in determining this time period, courts impose a
reasonable time based on the facts of each case.89 If the trustee
assumes the contract, then the trustee must promptly cure any
defaults, compensate the seller for any loss resulting from the
defaults and provide adequate assurance of future performance.9 °
The Code does not state when the defaults must be cured,91 nor
does it define what constitutes adequate assurance of future
performance.92 In addition, the debtor must fully perform the
86. Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection,"
59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 894 (1988) (hereinafter "Andrew I"). See infra note 365.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d).
88. See, e.g., Theatre Holding Corp. v. Mauro, 681 F.2d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 1982).
89. Bank of Honolulu v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 36 B.R. 120, 125 (Bankr. D.
Hawaii 1983). In In re Anderson, the court held that 18 months was too long of a time
period to be reasonable, and fixed the time for the debtor's assumption or rejection of the
contract at 120 days. Within the 120 day period, the debtor was required to cure her
arrearage under the land contract in full. Id. at 126.
90. Assumption is subject to court approval. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
91. The definition of prompt cure depends on the facts of each case. Compare In re
Coors of North Mississippi, Inc., 27 B.R. 918 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1983) (allowing a three year
cure period for defaults in a beer distributorship agreement) with General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Lawrence, 11 B.R. 44 (Bankr. N. D. Ga. 1981) (a cure period in excess
of a year is not a prompt cure).
92. Adequate assurance is also defined on a case by case basis. However, such adequate
assurance should not improve the position of the non-debtor contract party to the detriment
of the debtor. In re Grayhall Resources, Inc., 63 B.R. 382, 389 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
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contract by paying the original amount due under the contract
according to its terms.
If the trustee cannot comply with the assumption requirements,
then the trustee will be forced to reject the contract and the buyer
will lose the land.93 The rejection of the contract is then treated
as a breach,94 and such breach gives the non-debtor party (here,
the seller) a claim that is treated as if it arose prior to the bank-
ruptcy petition.9" If the debtor so breaches, the non-debtor party
has the remedies provided for in the contract; therefore, the seller
in this case is entitled to re-enter the land.
If the estate assumes the contract, all payments on the contract
including payments on account of prepetition defaults are treated
as administrative claims, because they are expenses of the estate.96
A plan of reorganization requires that priority claims be paid in
full,97 therefore, the installment land seller will be preferred over
almost all other creditors.
The theory behind giving administrative expense priority to
these payments is that the non-debtor party to the contract should
get the full benefit of his bargain because the contract is providing
a benefit to the estate.98  As a result, the "cost" of accepting a
contract is an assumption of the contract's liabilities on the part of
the estate.99 This rule allows the estate to realize on the value of
a contract asset in circumstances where it seems desirable to do
93. Note that even if the installment land contract is viewed as a mortgage, there is a
chance that the debtor will lose the land. The mortgagee retains the right to foreclose after
the bankruptcy case is closed if the buyer cannot maintain payments.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (1994). The claim will be treated as a general unsecured claim.
In re Walnut Associates, 145 B.R. 489, 493 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992). See generally DAVID G.
EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 5-7, 237-43 (1993).
96. Under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1), administrative expenses receive first priority in
payment. Administrative expenses include "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of
preserving the estate, including wages, salaries or commissions for services rendered after
commencement of the case," 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A), and any tax incurred by the estate,
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i). See In re Mushroom Transportation, 90 B.R. 718 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1988); In re Norwegian Health Spa, In., 79 B.R. 507 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) forbids a court from confirming a debtor's plan of
reorganization unless administrative claims are paid in full (unless the holder of the claim
has agreed to a different treatment). 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(a)(2) and 1322(a)(2) both state that
a plan must provide for the full payment of all priority claims, unless the holder of the claim
agrees otherwise.
98. Andrew I, supra note 86, at 883.
99. Id.
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SO." ° As a result, a debtor might assume a contract to purchase
fungible goods when the price of those fungible goods has in-
creased between the contract date and the delivery date, but reject
such a contract when the price has decreased."' 1 In the install-
ment land contract context, however, assumption can only benefit
the seller, not the buyer, for reasons advanced below.
The grant of administrative expense priority results in
unfairness to the debtor/buyer and to the debtor's unsecured
creditors. The debtor will be required, under a plan of reorganiza-
tion, to pay the full contract price for the property.0 2 That result
is not unfair if the fair market value of the land on the date of the
bankruptcy filing equals or exceeds the contract price. In that
scenario, both the installment seller and the mortgagee would be
entitled to full payment of their claims. However, if the contract
price exceeds the fair market value, then the treatment of the two
creditors is different. Suppose the creditor is M, mortgagee. The
outstanding amount due on the mortgage is $100,000, and, on the
date of the bankruptcy filing, the land is worth $90,000. M would
be entitled to $90,000, the amount of his secured claim, plus an
unsecured claim for $10,000, priority for which would be pro-rata
with all of the other unsecured creditors.0 3
On the other hand, if the creditor is C, executory contract
party, and the trustee assumed the contract, the creditor would be
entitled to the full $100,000, pursuant to the contract. In addition,
if the buyer is in default prior to the bankruptcy filing, or if the
100. Id. at 882.
101. Professor Westbrook illustrates that a trustee will assume a contract only when there
is a "Net Value" in assumption. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 263-70. Westbrook's analysis
is based on a contract to purchase fungible goods. Land, however, is unique.
102. In order for a plan of reorganization to be confirmed, all administrative claims must
be paid in full. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(9)(A), 1322(a)(2) (1994).
103. There is an exception to this rule in Chapter 11 if the mortgagee with an
undersecured claim makes the § 1111(b) election. Under § 1111(b), an undersecured creditor
can give up any right to vote on the plan of reorganization as an unsecured creditor. In
return, the undersecured creditor's claim is treated as fully secured and the creditor (the
mortgagee in my hypothetical) must be paid, over the course of the plan, the amount of that
claim ($100,000 in the hypothetical) and those payments must have a present value of at least
the amount of the secured portion ($90,000). 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1994). A
mortgagee makes this election in the belief that the value of the land will increase during the
course of the plan. Even if the mortgagee makes the § 1111(b) election, however, the
mortgagee is not paid according to the original terms of the mortgage, because, in the
hypothetical, the electing mortgagee would be entitled to $90,000 plus interest, not $100,000
plus interest. See, EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 95, at § 10-27; ELIZABETH WARREN AND JAY
WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, 728-30 (3d ed. 1996).
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buyer defaults after the plan is confirmed, all of the overdue
payments, pre-petition and post-petition, are also given administra-
tive expense priority.
This administrative expense priority does not make sense for
installment land contracts. The original rule regarding executory
contracts was designed to protect the estate from incurring
administrative liabilities and assure that parties to pending contracts
and leases "would not be elevated fortuitously to administrative
priority."1°4 According to one commentator:
Assumption is proper when the estate, as successor to the
debtor, can obtain the benefit of some contract or lease asset (if
it properly chooses to do so) only at the cost of taking on the
debtor's performance obligations. Any other use of "assump-
tion" confers priority for priority's sake, for the purpose of
elevating a claim to administrative status rather than as a means
of obtaining some contractual benefit. °5
However, if the seller's claim is viewed as a secured one, this
problem does not arise.
This *result is well illustrated in In re Frontier Properties.1
6
Under the contract at issue in that case, after a buyer default the
seller was entitled to treat the contract as a note and mortgage and
immediately foreclose and seek a deficiency judgment."°  The
trustee assumed the installment land contract and subsequently
rejected it." After rejection, the property was sold at a trustee's
sale, resulting in a deficiency claim."° The court ordered that the
deficiency claim, as well as interest on the deficiency, be treated as
administrative expenses under the debtor's plan."' The court
justified depriving unsecured creditors by stating that the assump-
tion of the installment land contract benefitted the unsecured
creditors. 1"
104. Andrew I, supra note 86, at 881.
105. Id. at 890.
106. 979 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1992).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1362.
109. Id. at 1361.
110. Id. at 1368.
111. Frontier Properties, 979 F.2d at 1367. The grant of administrative priority to post-
petition interest on the deficiency claim results in a particular benefit to the installment seller
over the mortgagee. As a general rule, post-petition interest has the lowest priority in
distribution. 11 U.S.C. § 726. A mortgagee may only receive post-petition interest when it
is oversecured. As a result, a mortgagee would never receive post-petition interest on a
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While the court's reasoning may be persuasive when applied
to some contracts of the debtor, such as supply contracts where the
assumption would allow the debtor to stay in business, it does not
seem persuasive for land contracts. If it were persuasive, all
secured creditors should be paid in full, because the debtor's use of
encumbered collateral benefits the estate, and thus benefits
unsecured creditors. Giving installment land contract payments
administrative priority, therefore, interferes with the debtor's fresh
start and results in unequal treatment of similarly situated creditors.
B. Treatment of Mortgages Under the Bankruptcy Code
On the other hand, if the installment land contract is viewed
as a security device, the seller will stand in the position of a
mortgagee in the bankruptcy case. If the value of the land is less
than the amount owing on the contract, the debtor purchaser will
be able to bifurcate the vendor's claim under § 506(a) of the Code
into a secured claim and an unsecured claim." 2 A reorganization
plan must then provide to the creditor the present value of the
secured claim." 3 On the other hand, if the value of the property
exceeds the amount owing on the contract, the remaining equity
would be available to the bankruptcy estate. In a Chapter 7 case,
this would benefit unsecured creditors by its availability for
distribution."4 In a reorganization under Chapters 11, 12 or 13,
this extra equity would also benefit general unsecured creditors
since under a reorganization plan an unsecured creditor must
receive at least what would have been received in a Chapter 7
case.
1 15
deficiency claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994). A debtor cannot modify the claim of a home mortgagee
in a Chapter 11 or 13 plan. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1322(b)(2).
A debtor's ability to bifurcate claims in Chapter 7 cases was addressed by the Supreme
Court in Dewsnup v. Timm, which held that a debtor could not "strip down" an undersecu-
red mortgagee's lien. 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992). The effect of that prohibition is to allow the
creditor to reap the benefit of any increase in the property's value between the date of the
bankruptcy petition and the sale of the property. Id. The application of Dewsnup is limited
to Chapter 7 cases.
113. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2)(A), 1325(a)(5) (1994).
114. 11 U.S.C. §§ 724, 726. The land would be sold as part of the liquidation, and any
excess in the sales price over the allowed liens on the property would be distributed to
general unsecured creditors.
115. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1225(a)(4), 1325(a)(4). There are other benefits,
particularly in a Chapter 11, arising out of the increased equity. The debtor could use the
extra equity as collateral for a post-petition loan, possibly allowing the debtor to remain in
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If the installment land contract is viewed as a mortgage the
seller is forbidden, by the automatic stay, from commencing or
continuing foreclosure or forfeiture proceedings.11 6  When the
debtor has stopped making payments prior to filing a bankruptcy
petition, the classification issue is crucial. Since § 362 prohibits
creditors from attempting to acquire property of the debtor or the
estate, the debtor keeps the land while the case is pending when
the contract is considered a mortgage." 7 If the contract is consid-
ered an executory contract, however, then upon rejection, the buyer
must surrender the land to the seller.
11 8
Moreover, treating an installment land contract as a mortgage
does not offend the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code. Under
the Code, a "lien" is a "charge against or interest in property to
secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation."'1 9
Thus, the Code recognizes the possibility of alternative mortgage
devices.
IV. The Tangled Judicial Treatment of Installment Land
Contracts In Bankruptcy
In bankruptcy cases, installment land contracts have received
inconsistent treatment. Courts have held both that the installment
business.
116. Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay upon the filing
of a petition under Chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, or 13. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994). Section 362(d)
sets forth grounds for relief from the stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994).
117. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
118. In Shaw v. Dawson, the court affirmed an order of the bankruptcy court holding that
a real estate contract, in which the debtors were the purchasers of the land, was an executory
contract under New Mexico law. 48 B.R. 857, 861-62 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985). Under § 365
of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor is required to either assume or reject executory
contracts. If the debtor chooses to assume the contract, any existing defaults must be cured,
and adequate assurance of future performance must be provided to the vendor. Id. at 859.
Because the debtors in this case were not financially able to cure, affirming the bankruptcy
court's order "had the practical effect of forcing [the debtors] to reject the contract and lose
the land." Id.
119. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1994).
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land contract is in substance a mortgage t2 and an executory
contract.
121
Courts holding that installment land contracts are security
devices for purposes of bankruptcy do so for a number of reasons.
Cited reasons include: state law determines a debtor's property
rights in bankruptcy;122 courts recognize alternative mortgage
devices; t23 and general purposes of the Code require that install-
ment land contracts be treated as financing devices."
Meanwhile, courts holding that an installment land contract is
an executory contract for purposes of bankruptcy also look to state
law.125 Other courts have applied the Countryman definition of
executory contract and have found it to fit installment land
contracts. 126  One court, pointing to the express mention of
installment land contracts in § 365(i) of the Code, concluded that,
even when the vendee is in bankruptcy, the contract should be
considered executory.
27
120. See, e.g., In re MCorp Financial, Inc., 137 B.R. 219 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992); Thorpe
v. Jones (In re Jones), 54 B.R. 697 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985); Reich v. Burke (In re Reich),
54 B.R. 995 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 1985); In re Leazier, 55 B.R. 870 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985);
Love v. Kradel (In re Love), 38 B.R. 771 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); In re Cox, 28 B.R. 588
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1983); In re Adolphsen, 38 B.R. 776 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983); In re Booth,
19 B.R. 53 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982)(rejecting the Countryman definition of executory
contract).
121. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dawson, 48 B.R. 857 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985); In re Speck, 50 B.R.
307 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985). In re Frontier Properties, 979 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1992); In re
Anderson, 36 B.R. 120 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1983).
122. This reasoning follows at least two lines. One is that if the state follows equitable
conversion, then the buyer is the owner of the land and the contract is merely a financing
device. In re McDaniel, 89 B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1988); In re Leazier, 55 B.R. 870.
The other is if the state has, by statute or case law, declared the land contract to be a
financing device, then it is. Mitchell v. Streets (In re Streets and Beard Farm Partnership),
882 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1989)(relying on Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48 (1979)).
123. See, e.g., In re Love, 38 B.R. 771 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); In re Himberger, 9 B.R.
278 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1981); In re Carr, 18 B.R. 794 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Climer, 10
B.R. 872 (W.D. Tenn. 1977). The Code recognizes the existence of liens other than by
mortgage. Under the Code, a lien is defined as a "charge against or interest in property to
secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
124. In re Adolphsen, 38 B.R. 776 (Bankr. D. Minn 1983).
125. In some states which do not recognize equitable conversion, the installment land
contract is considered to be an executory contract. See, e.g., Shaw, 48 B.R. 857 (applying
New Mexico law).
126. In re Speck, 50 B.R. 307, 308 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985).
127. Shaw, 48 B.R. at 860.
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A. In re Booth
In re Booth"2 is the most often cited case supporting the
position that an installment land contract should be treated as a
security device. The Booth court stated that the question of what
is and is not an executory contract should be decided by federal,
not state law.129 While recognizing the Countryman definition of
executory contract, the court in Booth noted further that the
Countryman test serves as a guide in determining when assumption
or rejection of a contract under § 365 will benefit the estate."
Accordingly, what is or is not executory should be tied to the
ultimate goals of reorganization.'31
Using this reasoning the Booth court stated that the install-
ment land contract benefits the bankruptcy estate more when
viewed as a mortgage than as an executory contract because such
treatment enlarges the value of the estate and furthers the debtor's
rehabilitation. 32 This reasoning, however, may lead to inconsis-
tent results, as there may be some instances in which viewing the
installment land contract as an executory contract may result in a
greater benefit to the estate.
133
The Booth reasoning, therefore, does not provide firm
guidance on the issue of whether installment land contracts are
subject to § 365. If contracting parties were to rely solely on
Booth, they might not know, at the outset of their relationship, how
their agreement would be viewed in bankruptcy.
B. The State Law Approaches
1. State Law as Determinative of Property Rights. -Many
courts adhere to the principle that, since a debtor's property rights
are governed by state law, the buyer's interest in the land subject
to an installment land contract likewise should be determined by
state law. As a result, state law characterization of installment land
contracts looms large in the reasoning of many courts considering
the issue. In states in which installment land contracts are
128. 19 B.R. 53 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
129. Id. at 62 n.20.
130. Id. at 55.
131. Id. at 56.
132. Id. at 58.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 186-94.
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considered under state law to be mortgages, courts in bankruptcy
cases also treat them as mortgages.' In In re Leazier,35 the
court first found that the contract was not executory,3 6 and then
held that because in Indiana, a land contract is treated the same as
a mortgage when the purchaser has "made any substantial payment
and has not abandoned the property," the contract could be treated
as a financing device in the debtor's Chapter 13 plan.137  The
court in In re Kratz'38 relied upon an Ohio statute which was
substantially similar to the Indiana statute considered by the
Leazier court.'39  Although the court in In re Fox"4 noted that
a Pennsylvania statute deemed installment land contracts to be
executory, the court found that the state could not define what
contracts were executory for purposes of federal law.'4 ' Further,
the court found that, particularly for residential installment land
contracts, the Pennsylvania courts and legislature had granted
installment buyers some of the same protections as mortgagors.
14 2
Some courts have held installment land contracts to be
executory contracts in states where forfeiture is still acceptable.'43
134. Heartline Farms v. Daly, 128 B.R. 246 (D. Neb. 1990). The court answered the
question of whether federal law should control the characterization of installment land
contracts in the negative, basing its decision primarily on the fact that Nebraska law
considers installment land contracts to be security devices. Id. The Nebraska statute says
that "an executory contract for the sale of land under which the vendee is entitled to or does
take possession thereof shall be deemed a mortgage of the land for the unpaid balance of
the purchase price." NEB REV. STAT. § 77-1401 (Reissue of 1990).
135. 55 B.R. 870 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985).
136. Id. at 872.
137. Id. The Indiana position is set forth in Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641 (Ind.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974). In Indiana, the buyer's interest in any land contract
under which the buyer has made a substantial downpayment must be foreclosed. Id. at 240-
41.
138. 96 B.R. 127 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
139. Id. Under the Ohio statute, if the buyer has paid a sum equal to or exceeding
twenty percent of the purchase price, or has paid in accordance with the terms of the
contract for a period of five years, then the seller may only recover possession of the land
by foreclosure. Id. at 129.
140. 83 B.R. 290 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
141. Id. at 296-97.
142. Id. at 297. The real property in Fox consisted of mixed residential and commercial
property.
143. See Shaw v. Dawson, 48 B.R. 857 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985). Shaw also stands for the
proposition that § 365(i) means that installment land contracts are executory. Id.; see also
In re Heartline Farms, Inc., 116 B.R. 694 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990)(holding that in Nebraska,
if strict foreclosure is allowed, the contract is executory, if the contract must be foreclosed,
then it is a mortgage). An installment land contract in Nebraska is treated as a mortgage
when the buyer has a substantial equity in the property. Id. at 698. This seems to take the
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However, the court in Bank of Honolulu v. Anderson (In re
Anderson)" still treated the land contract as an executory
contract rather than a security device while conceding that in
Hawaii, forfeiture is not permitted when a certain percentage of the
contract price has been paid.145 Reaching the opposite conclu-
sion, the court in In re McDaniel,146 applying a Washington
statute which allowed forfeiture, ruled that an installment land
contract is a mortgage because the forfeiture statute was similar to
the statute regulating the foreclosure of deeds of trust.
1 47
2. Adherence to Equitable Conversion as Determinative of the
Issue. -Other courts, relying on state law characterizations, point
to the state's adherence to the equitable conversion theory to treat
the installment land contract as a mortgage. Under the equitable
conversion theory, at the moment a buyer and seller sign a contract
for the sale of real estate, equitable ownership passes to the
buyer." The court in In re Bertelsen49 used this reasoning to
hold that an Illinois land contract is in the nature of a secured
transaction, since, upon the execution of a contract to sell real
estate, the seller becomes the trustee of the legal title for the buyer
with a lien on the land as security for the purchase price.'
question of "executoriness" out of the equation altogether.
144. Bank of Honolulu v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 36 B.R. 120 (Bankr. D. Haw.
1983).
145. Id. at 124-25. In Hawaii. if a debtor/buyer has a certain amount of equity in the
property, the seller must foreclose. The Bankruptcy Court sitting in Hawaii will not treat
the contract as a mortgage, however, and in Anderson, the court stated that a debtor cannot
"rush to the Bankruptcy Court and request the Court to change an ugly duckling (agreement
of sale) into a beautiful swan (mortgage)." Id. at 124. It is interesting to note that Hawaii
is one of the growing number of states that considers the seller's interest in the land subject
to an installment land contract to be personal property for purposes of the state judgment
lien laws. Bank of Hawaii v. Horwoth, 787 P.2d 674 (Haw. 1990).
146. 89 B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1988).
147. Id. at 869, In McDaniel, the court concluded that the installment land contract gives
the buyer a property right in the real estate and the seller a "lien/mortgage type security
interest." Id.
148. Vogel v. Northern Assurance Co., 219 F.2d 409 (3rd Cir. 1955).
149. 65 B.R. 654 (Bankr. C.D. I11. 1986). Another case applying Illinois law reached the
same conclusion. See In re Streets & Beard Farm Partnership, 882 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1989)
(concluding that "the vendor holds legal title in trust solely as security for the payment of
the purchase price").
150. In re Bertelsen, 65 B.R. 654, 657 (Bankr. C.D. IlI. 1986). This case has a little for
everyone. The court relies heavily on the In re Booth discussion of policy reasons for
holding that an installment land contract should be treated as a mortgage. The court also
addresses the application of the Countryman definition and the argument that since
installment land contracts are considered to be executory contracts when the seller is in
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Bankruptcy courts applying the laws of several other states have
reached the same result. 5 Pennsylvania adheres to the equitable
conversion theory,"'2 but in a case in which the debtor was a
seller under an earnest money contract for the sale of land, the
court held that the debtor could reject the contract pursuant to
§ 365.' Thus, it seems that equitable conversion alone does not
transform an executory contract into a security device."M Con-
versely, bankruptcy courts in states that do not adhere to equitable
conversion rely on that fact in order to characterize installment
land contracts as executory contracts.
1 55
C. "Executoriness" as a Threshold Issue
Some courts have found that installment land contracts simply
do not constitute contracts on which substantial performance is due
from both contracting parties. The court in In re Adolphsent56
took note of the apparent adoption of the Countryman test in the
legislative history to the Code, but found that, "the fact that [the
seller] holds legal title and must at some point convey it to the
debtors does not render the contract executory any more than the
duty of the holder of a promissory note to return the note when
the debt is satisfied makes it executory."' 7  The court in In re
Cox, 58 while apparently basing its holding on the reasoning of In
re Booth, also cited the lack of substantial performance on the part
of the seller, especially when the seller deposits the deed into
bankruptcy, they should be considered so when the buyer is in bankruptcy. Id. at 658.
151. Thorpe v. Jones (In re Jones), 54 B.R. 697 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985) (applying the
Arkansas view that execution of a contract for deed effects an equitable conversion); In re
Cox, 28 B.R. 588 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983)(applying Idaho law adopting equitable conversion);
Love v. Kradel (In re Love), 38 B.R. 771 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983)(applying Pennsylvania law,
which adopts equitable conversion, and recognizing the fact that the Bankruptcy Code does
recognize alternative mortgage devices).
152. Pivirotto v. City of Pittsburgh, 528 A.2d 125, 127-28 (Pa. 1987).
153. In re W & L Associates, Inc., 71 B.R. 962 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
154. See also In re Carver, 61 B.R. 824 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1986), rev'd on other grounds 71
B.R. 20 (D.S.D. 1986)(recognizing that South Dakota adopts equitable conversion but
holding that an installment land contract is not a mortgage under South Dakota law).
155. See, e.g., In re Finley, 138 B.R. 181 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992); In re Waldron, 65 B.R.
169 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
156. 38 B.R. 776 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983).
157. Id. at 778. The legislative history to the Code uses a promissory note as an example
of a contract which is not executory. See H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1977)
& S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong, 2d Sess. 58.(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5936, 5787.
158. 28 B.R. 588 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983).
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escrow upon execution of the contract.159 Likewise, the Seventh
Circuit, in In re Streets & Beard Farm Partnership,1" based its
holding on the equitable conversion doctrine, but added that, "the
delivery of a legal title is a mere formality and does not represent





Many courts start their analysis of the issue by inquiring about
whether the installment land contract fits within the "Countryman
definition" of executory contract. The court in Bank of Honolulu
v. Anderson (In re Anderson) made a distinction between land
contracts under which the deed was placed in escrow and land
contracts under which the deed was not placed in escrow. The court
held that the seller's failure to place the deed in escrow constituted
a lack of substantial performance, and thus, the contract was still
executory.162  The court in In re Frontier Properties163 also used
this argument in holding that installment land contracts are
executory.
164
However, the escrow argument does not persuade all courts.
In Shaw v. Dawson,165 the court considered the fact that the deed
was placed in escrow to be irrelevant and held that because the
buyer was required to make payments and the seller was to deliver
the deed, the contract was executory."
Courts have pointed to various other contractual duties of the
seller in finding that installment land contracts are within the
Countryman definition. In Frontier Properties, the court considered
material the fact that the seller was required to pay underlying
debts, taxes and insurance premiums on the property and conclud-
ed that the seller retained substantial obligations under the
contract. 167 Likewise, in Anderson, the seller was required to pay
159. Id. at 590.
160. 882 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1989).
161. Id. at 235.
162. In re Anderson, 36 B.R. 120, 125 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1983). The court in In re Speck
also relied on the fact that the seller was required to deliver title upon the buyer's full
payment of the purchase price in ruling that performance was due on both sides and,
therefore, the installment land contract was executory. 50 B.R. 307, 308 (Bankr. D.S.D.
1985).
163. 979 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1992).
164. Id.
165. Shaw v. Dawson, 48 B.R. 857 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985).
166. Id. at 861. The court in In re Buchert reached the same conclusion. 69 B.R. 816, 820
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987).
167. 979 F.2d at 1365.
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for utilities under the contract, another fact which the court
considered in ruling the contract executory.' 6s However, pur-
chase-money mortgagees will often pay the taxes and insurance on
the subject property out of escrow in order to make sure that their
interest in the property is protected.
Under section 2-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the
"U.C.C.") 169 any attempted reservation of title by a seller of
goods who delivers the goods to the buyer is limited to the
reservation of a security interest in the goods.7 ' The court in In
re Fitch' relied heavily on this section in ruling that a contract
for the sale of a business, which involved the transfer of land,
personal property, and the goodwill of the business, constituted a
security device rather than an executory contract.172  The court
pointed out that a contract under which no performance is due
other than the payment of money, as was the case with the contract
in Fitch, is not executory under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.
17 3
The argument that if the seller has outstanding duties, such as
delivery of the deed upon full payment, then the contract is
executory must fail because under that analysis even a mortgage
could be considered executory. Upon full payment of the mortgage
indebtedness, the lender/mortgagee must cancel the note evidencing
the indebtedness and release the mortgage lien. 4  One court
held that an installment land contract was executory because the
seller was required to give his consent before any assignment of the
contract by the buyer could be effective.17 5 Again, commonly, a
mortgagee must consent to any proposed assignment or assumption
of the mortgage. The court in In re Bellamah Community
Development7 6 pointed to the following unperformed obligations
of the seller in ruling that a subdivision trust was an installment
168. In re Anderson, 36 B.R. 120, 125 (Bank. D. Haw. 1983).
169. U.C.C. § 2-401 (1995).
170. Id.
171. In re Fitch, 174 B.R. 96 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994).
172. Id. at 103 (holding that an installment contract for purchase of business, which
included real property, goods and intangibles such as good will, was a security device, relying
on equitable conversion for the real estate, and U.C.C. for the goods).
173. Id. at 104.
174. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-707 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 25, § 2111 (1989 & Supp. 1994); 21 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 681 (1983 & Supp.
1995).
175. In re Henke, 84 B.R. 693, 698 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988).
176. In re Bellamah Community Development, 107 B.R. 337 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1989).
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land contract and thus executory: the seller had the right to pay
the taxes if the buyer failed to do so; the seller could only declare
the buyer in default of the agreement by delivering notice of same
to the buyer; and the seller could only accelerate the indebtedness
by written notice.177 Again, in mortgage agreements, one finds
the same rights and duties on the part of the mortgagee. As a
result, it seems that defining a contract as executory or not is not
an appropriate starting point for determining whether § 365 applies.
D. Bankruptcy Policy as the Determinative Factor
Courts on both sides of the issue have pointed to general
bankruptcy policies in order to determine whether an installment
land contract is a security device or an executory contract. In
answering this question, some courts have held that the proper
interpretation depends on which characterization would be more
beneficial to the estate.178 Several cases dealing with installment
land contracts have arisen in Chapter 13 proceedings,79 and
particularly in these cases, courts have found that characterizing the
installment land contract as a security device is more beneficial to
the debtor than characterizing the contract as executory."
According to the court in In re Fox, the interest of the debtor was
so strong that the debtor was given a choice as to how to character-
ize the contract. 8' That court, like the court in In re Booth,
applied the "functional nature" of Countryman's definition, and
characterized an installment land contract conveying mixed
residential and commercial realty as a secured sale because doing
so would benefit the estate.' 8' This result seems undesirable
177. Id. at 341 (involving an agreement known as a subdivision trust, in which the title
to the land is delivered to a trustee).
178. See, e.g., In re McCallen, 49 B.R. 948 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985); In re Thurmond, 46 B.R.
723 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985).
179. See, e.g., Fox v. Hill (In re Fox), 83 B.R. 290 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Flores,
32 B.R. 455 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1983).
180. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Jones (In re Jones), 54 B.R. 697, 699 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1985)("treatment of this contract for deed as a security instrument will diminish the
likelihood of a forfeiture of the debtor's equity in her homestead which should be preserved
where possible"). Under § 1322 of the Code and Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508
U.S. 324 (1993), it is unclear whether the characterization would make much of a difference
when a home is involved.
181. In re Fox, 83 B.R. at 291.
182. Id. at 301. The opinion states that, "[section] 365 should be conceptualized as a tool
of the Debtor, to benefit the estate at the debtor's option wherever possible, and should
rarely, if ever, be used to deprive a consumer-debtor of a residence." Id. at 294. In Fox, the
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since, if it were widely adopted, sellers would have no way of
anticipating how their agreements would be viewed in bankruptcy.
Moreover, courts applying Oregon law have reached conflicting
results applying this "benefit to the estate" analysis."' The
dispute in In re McCallen1 4 was whether § 108(b)"8 5 or § 362 of
the Code applied in order to toll a statutory redemption period
after a judgment of strict foreclosure entered upon the debtor's
default under an installment land contract.1 6 The court found
that after such a judgment, the debtor retained the right to possess
the land.1" Looking to the policy of benefitting the estate and
encouraging the debtor's rehabilitation, the court found that the
automatic stay should apply."a In bolstering its conclusion that
§ 362 controlled, the court pointed to the fact that § 108(b) does
not apply to curing defaults "under executory contracts" because
such a cure would be governed by § 365.189 Had the court ruled
that the contract was a mortgage, the right of redemption would
real property consisted of a storefront and a three-bedroom apartment above it. Id. at 293.
Section 1322(b)(2) prohibits the modification of rights of holders of secured claims "secured
only by a security interest in real estate that is the debtor's principal residence." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(b)(2). Courts have interpreted § 1322(b)(2) only to loans secured solely by a single-
family residence. In re Leazier, 55 B.R. 870 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985); Grubbs v. Houston
First American Savings Assoc., 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984).
In any event, courts in the Third Circuit (which includes Pennsylvania, the state in
which Fox arose) seem extremely reluctant to prohibit residential debtors from bifurcating
their mortgage liens, and it appears that any additional collateral taken by the mortgage
lender will remove a mortgage from the purview of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) in the Third
Circuit. Hammond v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. of America (In re Hammond), 27
F.3d 52 (3d Cir. 1994) (mortgage also covered appliances, machinery, furniture and
equipment); Third National Bank Trust Co. v. Tallo (In re Tallo), 168 B.R. 573 (M.D. Pa.
1994) (security interest in rents, issues and profits "removed mortgagee's protection against
modification of claims secured only by the debtor's residence").
183. Compare In re McCallen, 49 B.R. 948 (Bank. D. Or. 1985) with In re Thurmond, 46
B.R. 723 (D. Or. 1985).
184. 49 B.R. 948.
185. Section 108(b) states that if applicable non-bankruptcy law or an agreement fixes
the period within which the debtor'may file any pleading, cure any default or perform any
other similar act, and
such period has not expired before the date of the filing the petition, the trustee
may only file, cure or perform, as the case may be, before the later of-
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring
on or after the commencement of the case; or
(2) 60 days after the order for relief.
11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (1994).
186. In re McCallen, 49 B.R. 948.
187. Id. at 951.
188. Id. at 952.
189. Id.
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have expired upon the later of 60 days after the bankruptcy filing
or the end of the state created redemption period.' °
In another case decided by the bankruptcy court sitting in
Oregon, the benefit to the estate approach led to the opposite
result. In In re Thurmond19' the bankruptcy court followed
Booth and ruled that an installment land contract was a mortgage
and stated that contracts must be reviewed in light of the policies
of benefitting the estate, encouraging the debtor's rehabilitation,
and providing adequate protection for the estate's creditors. 192
Leading to tremendous uncertainty, this approach would leave the
contracting parties in the position of not knowing how their
agreement will be treated in the event of the buyer's bankruptcy.
Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code'93 was designed to
provide relief to family farmers because relief was previously
unavailable under Chapters 7 and 11 of the Code.94 In Heartline
Farms v. Daly,195 the court held that the installment land contract
at issue was a mortgage because Nebraska law considers them to
be mortgages. 96 The court added that the policy behind Chapter
12 would be frustrated by characterizing an installment land
contract as an executory contract. 97 However, in Brown v. First
National Bank in Lenox,'98 an Eighth Circuit case applying Iowa
law, the court rejected the debtors' argument that the special
policies behind Chapter 12 warranted a finding that an installment
land contract is a security device. 99  In re Rancho
Chamberino2° is another case under Chapter 12 in which the
court considered whether an installment land contract is an
190. See 11 U.S.C. § 108(b). See also Johnson v. First National Bank of Montevideo (In
re Oak Farms, Inc.), 37 B.R. 178 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
191. 46 B.R. 723 (D. Or: 1985).
192. Id. at 724.
193. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (1994).
194. Melanie Fisher, Disposable Income Determination: Challenges in the Chapter 12
Family Farmer Context, 18 J. CORP. L. 713, 716 (1993). The legislative history of Chapter
12 also sheds light upon the impetus behind its enactment. According to House Conference
Notes, the family farmer provision was "designed to give family farmers facing bankruptcy
a fighting chance to reorganize their debts and keep their land." H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 958,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5246, 5249.
195. 128 B.R. 246 (D. Neb. 1990).
196. Id. at 248-49.
197. Id. at 252.
198. 844 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1988).
199. Id. at 581.
200. 77 B.R. 555 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987).
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executory contract and, declining to follow Booth, found that it
was.2 1 The court in In re Coffinan2 2 applied a three-pronged
test in resolving the issue of whether a land sale contract is an
executory contract. The court looked to: (1) the nature of the
parties' relationship under state law; (2) the definition of executory
contract under bankruptcy law; and (3) the policies behind the
bankruptcy laws. 3 The Coffman court ultimately concluded that
the installment land contract is an executory contract, not a security
device. °4
E. The Argument that § 365(i) Renders all Installment Land
Contracts Executory
Congress specifically recognized installment land contracts in
§ 365(i) and § 3650) of the Code.205 Those sections address
installment land contracts under which the debtor is the seller of
the land. Section 365(i) protects the non-debtor buyer of land
when the buyer is in possession by allowing the buyer, in the event
the trustee rejects the contract, to either treat the contract as
terminated, or remain in possession, make all payments, and
receive title to the property in accordance with the contract.2°6
Section 3650) protects the buyer who elects to treat the contract as
terminated by giving the buyer a lien on the real property to the
extent of the purchase price paid before termination.7
The specific inclusion of certain installment land contracts
within the scope of § 365 was central to the court's reasoning in
Shaw v. Dawson.21 The Shaw court, in holding that an install-
ment land contract, under which the buyer was the debtor, fell
within § 365, reasoned that the express recognition of installment
land contracts in § 365(i) evidenced Congress' intention that all
installment land contracts be treated as executory under § 3 65.2'9
The court also reasoned that, since the Code provides for special
treatment under § 365 when the seller is the debtor, but is silent as
201. Id. at 558-61.
202. 104 B.R. 958 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1988).
203. Id. at 961.
204. Id. at 963.
205. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i), () (1994).
206. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
207. 11 U.S.C. § 365(j).
208. 48 B.R. 857 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985).
209. Id. at 860.
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to special treatment when the buyer is the debtor, Congress did not
intend any special treatment for a buyer/debtor.21 °
The effect of § 365(i) is to give the non-debtor purchaser
under an installment land contract the same protections which
would be provided for a mortgagor upon its mortgagee's bankrupt-
cy. The Code incorporated § 365(i) to ameliorate the evil
caused by cases such as In re New York Investors Mutual
Group,212 which allowed an installment land seller, in bankruptcy,
to reject the contract and deprive the non-debtor buyer-in-posses-
sion of the land.213 Under § 365(i), a buyer is entitled to remain
in possession, even if the seller/debtor rejects the contract so long
as the buyer continues making payments on the contract.2 4 Prior
to the enactment of § 365(i), courts were split as to whether a debt-
or/seller could deprive a buyer in possession of its possession by
rejecting the contract of sale.215
The argument that § 365(i) should be construed to include all
installment land contracts within the definition of executory
contract was rejected in In re Fox.216 The Fox court interpreted
the purpose behind § 365(i) to be one of preserving the rights of
persons in possession of realty.217 Congress enacted § 365(i) to
provide fairness for purchasers in possession and did not consider
the executoriness of the installment land contract device.218
Likewise, the Booth court noted that §§ 365(i) and (j) do not
210. Id.
211. If the debtor/seller were a mortgagee, that seller would have two property interests
which could go into the bankruptcy estate: its right to payment under the mortgage note, and
its lien on the land. See NELSON & WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, § 5.27. There is
nothing in the Bankruptcy Code which would allow the mortgagee's trustee to recover the
legal interest in the land for the estate. See Frank R. Lacy, Land Sale Contracts in
Bankruptcy, 21 UCLA L. REV. 477, 480 (1973)("[c]learly, nothing in the Bankruptcy Act
empowers the trustee to retrieve ... property already sold by the bankrupt.").
212. 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
213. Id.
214. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i).
215. See, e.g., In re New York Investors Mutual Group, 143 F. Supp. at 54 (allowing the
trustee in bankruptcy to reject the contract with a resulting return of possession to the
debtor/seller).
216. 83 B.R. 290 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
217. Id. at 301.
218. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 60, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5846
(stating that subsections (h) and (i) of § 365 were enacted to protect non-debtors in
possession of real property).
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represent the Countryman test, but "are a tonic for the conse-
quence of its application. '
The foregoing survey of case law shows the great inconsistency
among the courts in addressing installment land contracts in
bankruptcy. The discussion which follows will show that since
installment land contracts are enhanced remedy mortgages, they
should be treated as such in bankruptcy and that bankruptcy policy
mandates uniformity in the treatment of installment land contracts
in bankruptcy.
V. The Need for Uniformity
Congress has the power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws
for the United States under Article I section 8 of the United States
Constitution.2" Courts have long interpreted this mandate as
meaning that state laws are suspended only to the extent of actual
conflict with the federal bankruptcy system.221 Courts have not
interpreted the Constitution to require that results in bankruptcy
cases be uniform from state to state.222 In solving the problem of
whether an installment land contract is an executory contract or a
mortgage, courts must apply two principles of bankruptcy law: the
principle that property rights are determined by state law223 and
the principle that federal law determines whether or not a contract
is executory within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.24
A. The Installment Land Contract as an Enhanced-Remedy
Mortgage
The principle that state law determines property rights in
bankruptcy raises the following question: what exactly are those
219. In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 56 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
220. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
221. See Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918). See also Ogden v. Sanders, 12
Wheat. 213 (1827); Sturges v. Crowninshiel, 4 Wheat. 122 (1819).
222. Stellwagen, 245 U.S. at 613.
223. Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48 (1979). Butner is repeatedly cited by courts as leading
authority for this issue. See,' e.g., In re D'Anna, 177 B.R. 819, 823 (Bankr. E.D. Pa
1995)(emphasizing that the holding of Butner remains valid under the Bankruptcy Code of
1978); Coan v. Bernier (In re Bernier), 176 B.R. 976 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995)(quoting Butner
for proposition that property interests are created by state law unless some federal interest
requires otherwise); In re White, 88 B.R. 498, 510 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988)(recognizing that,
under Butner, a bankruptcy court shall not give a creditor rights that state law withholds).
224. See, e.g., Benevides v. Alexander (In re Alexander), 670 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir.
1982); Murphy v. Griffel (In re Wegner), 61 B.R. 414, 418 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986).
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rights which must be respected?2" The seller under an install-
ment land contract has, in some states, the right to reenter the land
upon default without legal process and cause the buyer to forfeit all
equity in the land.226 Is it that remedy which must be respected,
or is it the seller's right to the value of that land which must be
respected? There are two primary differences between the land
contract and the purchase-money mortgage: the location of legal
title;227 and the seller's remedies upon default.2"
The fact that, under an installment land contract, the seller
holds the deed to the real property until the full contract price is
paid does not justify the disparate treatment of installment land
contracts and mortgages in bankruptcy. When a seller of goods
under an installment contract attempts to keep title to those goods
after delivery to the seller, the law is settled. The retention of title
is in effect the retention of a security interest.22 9 Even in real
estate law, the location of title is irrelevant in certain circumstances.
In states which use the deed of trust instead of the mortgage, title
is actually transferred from the mortgagor (known in such states as
a "trustor") to a trustee for the benefit of the mortgagee, known in
such states as the "beneficiary." The mortgagee/beneficiary,
however, is treated in bankruptcy as a secured creditor. The court
in In re Cox"3 pointed to the fact that deeds of trust are consid-
ered security devices to strengthen its holding that an installment
land contract is a security device.2
Even in the context of purchase-money mortgages, however,
the rights of the seller/mortgagee differ. It is useful, therefore, to
compare the various foreclosure laws.
A comparison of the title theory, 2 the lien theory2 3 and
225. See generally James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in
Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the
Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973 (1983).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 24-33.
227. See supra text accompanying note 3.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 24-33, 47-69.
229. U.C.C. § 2-401 (1995). See infra note 328 and accompanying text.
230. 28 B.R. 588 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983).
231. Id. at 590.
232. The title theory of mortgages has its roots in the English Common Law. Today,
only about twelve American states follow the title theory. For a discussion of the history and
application of the title theory of mortgages, see NELSON AND WHITMAN TREATISE, supra
note 3, §§ 4.1, 4.24; Wesley A. Sturges & Samuel 0. Clark, Legal Theory and Real Property
Mortgages, 37 YALE L.J. 691, 702 (1928).
[100:4
1996] INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY 769
the intermediate theory of mortgages' illustrates some of the
differences in remedies under purchase-money mortgages. In title
theory states, the mortgagee is considered to hold legal title to the
land for security purposes. 5  Since the right to possession is a
fundamental incident of the mortgagee's legal title, the mortgagee
in a title theory state has, in theory, the right to take possession of
the land both before and after default.26  The mortgagee will
agree not to exercise that right while the mortgagor is current in his
payments.21 7  In lien theory states, the mortgagor holds full title
to the land, and thus, until foreclosure, the mortgagee does not
have the right to take possession of the land absent a clause in the
mortgage allowing the mortgagee to do so. 8  In intermediate
theory states, the mortgagor holds legal title to the land until
default, after which time the legal title is in the mortgagee.239
Thus, the mortgagee has the right to possession of the land upon
default.2' However, mortgagees in all three types of states are
treated equally for purposes of bankruptcy, as secured creditors,
and as a result, all three types of mortgagees are prevented by the
automatic stay from exercising their rights under the mortgages."1
Therefore, in the mortgage arena, the bankruptcy laws disregard
state created distinctions in remedies, in the sense that all remedies
are put on hold during the bankruptcy case.
While the differences in title, lien and intermediate jurisdic-
tions have the most impact on the relationship between the
mortgagor and the mortgagee, as between the mortgagor and third
parties, the mortgagor is the legal owner of the land.242 As a
233. About two thirds of the states follow the lien theory. Note that in such states, even
if title is actually transferred, the mortgagor has the right of possession until foreclosure.
Thus, under a deed of trust, the trustee, who holds the legal title for the benefit of the
mortgagee (called the beneficiary in such states), has no right to enter upon the land until
there has been a foreclosure sale. For a general discussion of the lien theory, see NELSON
AND WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, § 4.2; Sturges and Clark, supra note 232.
234. Four states follow the intermediate theory of mortgages. For a general discussion,
see NELSON AND WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, § 4.3; Sturges & Clark, supra note 232.
235. See NELSON AND WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, §§ 4.1, 4.24.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at § 4.2.
239. Id. at § 4.3.
240. See NELSON AND WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, § 4.3.
241. 11 U.S.C § 362 (1994).
242. Sturges & Clark, supra note 232, at 704. Sturges & Clark explain several
hypothetical situations illustrating the point that there is no real difference among the
theories save for the mortgagee's right to enter upon the land.
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result, the mortgagor can possess, lease, or further encumber the
land.243 Likewise, the buyer under an installment land contract,
while not the legal owner, does have a mortgageable interest in the
land, even in states which recognize the forfeiture remedy. In
addition, the buyer's interest in the land can be reached by
docketing a judgment lien against the buyer-debtor's real proper-
ty.24A
In the real property mortgage context, therefore, the Code
modifies state law rights which are arguably property rights, such
as the right of possession. For instance, in states that follow the
title and intermediate theories of mortgages, the mortgagee has the
right to enter the property after default and before foreclosure.
Once the mortgagor has filed for bankruptcy, however, the
mortgagee cannot exercise those property rights, due to the
automatic stay.14 Therefore, while the mortgagee's right under
state law is that of title holder, it is indisputable that under
bankruptcy law the mortgagee is a secured creditor. "6
Likewise, foreclosure procedures vary greatly from state to
state. In some states, strict foreclosure is permitted. In others,
243. The mortgagor's actions would of course be subject to any restrictions -in the
mortgage documents.
244. NELSON AND WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, §§ 3.35, 3.36. These propositions
hold true both in states that have kept forfeiture and states that have not, as well as states
which recognize equitable conversion and those that do not.
245. The filing of a bankruptcy petition
operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of -
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), (4).
246. In Heartland Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Briscoe Enterprises, Ltd. (In re
Briscoe Enterprises, Ltd.), 994 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1993), the court explained this
"alteration of ... mortgagees' rights," noting that "[b]ankruptcy frequently rewrites the
secured creditor's state law rights. Id. An example of this is the automatic stay of § 362, as
a result of which the creditor has lost the right of foreclosure." Id. The prohibition on
foreclosure, however, is not absolute. In effect, "the automatic stay provision ... prohibits
a mortgagee from obtaining either possession of the mortgaged property or the appointment
of a receiver to collect the rents therefrom without first requesting the bankruptcy court to
grant relief from the stay .... " First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. of Toledo v. Hunter
(In re Sam A. Tisci, Inc.), 133 B.R. 857, 859 (N.D. Ohio 1991). "All that the automatic stay
does is to force creditors and other interested parties to seek the bankruptcy court's approval
before taking certain types of action against a debtor or against property of the estate."
Delta Savings and Loan Assoc. Inc. v. I.R.S., 847 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 1988).
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foreclosure is by a power of sale contained in the mortgage and no
court action is necessary.247 In still others, a mortgagee can only
foreclose by judicial action. Bankruptcy stays all of these
rights.24  Since an installment seller is, in substance, a mortgagee
with the enhanced remedy of strict foreclosure, the installment
seller should be treated as such. The court in In re Speck,249 while
holding that an installment land contract is executory, recognized
the status of an installment land contract as a financing device with
enhanced remedies, stating,
The contract for deed is one of the few alternatives to commer-
cial financing available, and it is especially well suited to the
realities of agricultural land sales. To those who have always
relied upon the intrinsic value of the land, holding the deed is
more than a ministerial act, it is the ultimate protection.'
An enhanced remedy does not qualify as a property right. 5
In The Gold Clause Cases , the Court addressed contractually
created "property" rights in the following manner:
Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional
authority of Congress. Contracts may create rights of property,
but when contracts deal with a subject matter which lies within
the control of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity.
Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of
247. This is commonly used in "deed of trust" states.
248. Because of the automatic stay provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362, a bankruptcy filing stays
any foreclosure proceeding brought by a mortgagee prior to the filing. Also, if a mortgagee
has not yet started foreclosure proceedings prior to the bankruptcy filing, it may not do so
after the filing without the permission of the bankruptcy court. DUNAWAY, supra note 28,
§ 24.02[1].
249. 50 B.R. 307 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985).
250. Id. at 308.
251. For a good discussion of property rights which must be respected in bankruptcy, in
the context of a takings argument, see Rogers, supra note 225.
There is substantial disagreement as to whether specific performance rights qualify as
property rights and whether, as such, they should be respected in bankruptcy. See infra notes
255-57 and accompanying text.
252. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., Nortz v. Unites States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935),
and Perry v. United States, 294-U.S. 330 (1935), are commonly known as the Gold Clause
Cases. The plaintiffs in the Gold Clause Cases challenged a Resolution of Congress which
invalidated clauses in contracts which gave the payee the right to demand payment in gold
or an amount of money measured by gold. The Court held that the Resolution, which
required that every obligation be discharged in any currency which at the time is legal
tender, was a valid exercise of Congress' power over the monetary system. Norman, 294
U.S. at 316.
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dominant constitutional power by making contracts about
them.2s3
Professor Rogers, in arguing that the modification of a secured
creditor's claim in a bankruptcy case does not constitute an
unconstitutional taking, points out that a debtor and an unsecured
creditor cannot enter into a contract which provides that, in the
event of insolvency, the contracting creditor would be paid ahead
of all other creditors, since one cannot contract out of the bank-
ruptcy power.254 Clearly, a mortgage cannot provide that mort-
gagee can obtain the subject property by strict foreclosure upon the
mortgagor's bankruptcy. However, that is exactly what the seller
under an installment land contract is doing: contracting out of the
bankruptcy power.
Some of the literature regarding treating the remedy of specific
performance as property is worth noting. One could analogize the
seller's rights under an installment land contract to the right of
specific performance. If the right of specific performance were
considered a state created property right, as some have urged, then
bankruptcy law would respect that right.2 5 If, in bankruptcy, a
non-debtor party to a contract could enforce a right of specific
performance, then that creditor would be paid 100 percent on its
claim while the debtor's other creditors would be entitled to only
their pro-rata share in the distribution. Some critics of that
position claim that such a recognition would violate the equality
principle,256 while others advocate focusing on the state law
attributes of the specific performance right and urge that if the
effect of the specific performance clause would be to give the
creditor priority over the debtor's other creditors outside of
bankruptcy, then the right should be honored in the debtor's
bankruptcy. If outside of bankruptcy, the specific performance
right would not elevate the creditor over all others, then it should
not be honored.2 7 The seller's remedies under an installment
253. Norman, 294 U.S. at 307-08.
254. Rogers, supra note 225, at 994-95. It is well settled that in bankruptcy a secured
creditor is entitled only to the value of the collateral securing its debt. Wright v. Union
Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 278 (1940).
255. For a detailed discussion of treating remedies, particularly the remedy of specific
performance, as property, see David Frisch, Remedies as Property: A Different Perspective
on Specific Performance Clauses, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691 (1994).
256. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 5, at 245.
257. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LiMITs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 65-
66, 110-11 (1986).
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land contract do not elevate the seller over the buyer's other
creditors any more than a mortgagee holds on elevated position
over other creditors. If the buyer mortgages its interest .in the
land 258 subject to an installment land contract, the rights of its
mortgagee are the same as those of a second mortgagee. Even in
states that permit forfeiture, the seller cannot take the land without
giving the buyer's mortgagee notice and an opportunity to protect
itself.259  As a result, since outside of bankruptcy the enhanced
remedy of the installment land seller places it in the same position
as a purchase-money mortgagee vis a vis later mortgagees, there is
no reason to give the enhanced remedy an exalted status inside of
bankruptcy.
B. The Conflict Between State Laws Allowing Forfeiture and
Bankruptcy Policy
Several courts holding that an installment land contract is an
executory contract justify their holdings by requiring that state laws
be respected in bankruptcy.26  When state laws violate the
general scheme of the federal bankruptcy laws, however, the
bankruptcy laws will override state law.261 It is important to note
that many of the courts reaching the conclusion that an installment
land contract is a mortgage do not address the issue of the possible
supremacy of the Bankruptcy Code, reaching their conclusions
solely on state law characterizations.262
A good example of a conflict between state-created rights and
bankruptcy policy exists in § 522(f) of the Code,263 which allows
a debtor to avoid the fixing of a lien that is a nonpossessory,
nonpurchase-money security interest in certain consumer goods and
258. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
259. NELSON & WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, § 3.35.
260. See Shaw v. Dawson, 48 B.R. 857, 861 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985); Bank of Honolulu v.
Anderson (In re Anderson), 36 B.R. 120 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1983).
261. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (decided under the Bankruptcy Act); Penn
Terra, Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
262. This result is explicitly stated in In re McDaniel, 89 B.R. 861, 872, n.7 (Bankr. E.D.
Wash. 1988). The McDaniel court did, however, state that there was no overriding
bankruptcy policy reason to treat the installment land contract as an executory contract
contrary to Washington law. Id. at 875. The court in In re Buchert noted that Congress
recognized an overriding federal policy in the case of collective bargaining agreements and
installment land contracts under which the debtor is the seller, and found that when the
debtor is the buyer, there is no reason to override state law. 69 B.R. 816, 820 (Bankr. N.D.
I11. 1987).
263. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (1994).
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tools of the debtor's trade if that security interest impairs an
exemption to which the debtor is otherwise entitled.2" Under
that section, the debtor can avoid a consensual lien otherwise valid
under state law.265 This disregard of a state-created property
right is valid because to rule otherwise would harm the debtor's
right to a fresh start.
Another example of the Bankruptcy Code displacing
state-created rights is § 552 of the Code,2 6 which terminates the
effect of after-acquired property clauses in valid security agree-
ments. 267 The Uniform Commercial Code provides that a security
agreement may "provide that any or all obligations covered by the
security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collater-
al. ' ' 21 Once the debtor files for bankruptcy, however, this
floating lien ceases to float, for § 552 provides that "property
acquired by the estate or the debtor after the commencement of
the [bankruptcy] case is not subject to any lien resulting from any
security agreement entered into by the debtor before the com-
mencement of the case., 269  Again, any contrary rule in the
Bankruptcy Code would hinder the debtor's fresh start.
264. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(B). Under subsection (f):
[T]he debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property
to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have
been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is-
(B) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any [named
consumer goods].
11 U.S.C. § 522 (f)(1)(B).
265. The Uniform Commercial Code allows nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security
interests in consumer goods. See U.C.C. § 9-107 (1994). The U.C.C. does not, however,
allow liens to attach to consumer goods under after-acquired property clauses. An after-
acquired property clause will not be valid when the collateral is consumer goods unless the
debtor receives such goods within ten days after the secured party gives value. U.C.C. § 9-
204(2) (1994). In 1984, through the passage of the FTC Credit Practices Rule, Congress
prospectively banned nonpurchase-money security interests in consumer goods when a bank
is the lender. 12 C.F.R. § 227.13 (1995). "Thereafter, security interests became, by
definition, property interests that could not encumber certain consumer goods, at least so far
as bankruptcy courts were concerned." David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest under the
Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 585-86 (1989).
266. 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
267. Id.
268. U.C.C. § 9-204.
269. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a). This termination of the floating lien does not apply to after-
acquired proceeds, product, offspring, rents or profits of the original collateral, if the security
agreement extends to such proceeds, product, offspring, or profits. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b).
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Many of the cases addressing the uniformity question deal with
the differences among state exemption laws, differences which are
permitted under the Code.27° In In re Sullivan,271 the Seventh
Circuit upheld Illinois' decision to opt out of the federal scheme of
exemptions.27 2 In doing so, the court ruled that the Bankruptcy
Code requires only "geographical uniformity," not true uniformi-
ty.273 Therefore, as long as debtors in the same state are treated
equally, the requirement of uniformity is met.
In holding that only geographical uniformity is required in
bankruptcy, Sullivan relied on Hanover National Bank v.
Moyses.274 The Moyses court addressed the constitutionality of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the "Act"), because the Act provided
no federal- exemptions and thus allowed all debtors to take
advantage of state exemptions.275 The Court in Moyses ruled that
the bankruptcy system is uniform within its constitutional mandate
"when the trustee takes in each [s]tate whatever would have been
available to the creditors if the bankrupt law had not been
passed. 1
27 6
As applied to installment land contracts therefore, in order to
have geographical uniformity, the contract must be treated like a
mortgage. In most states, prior to the time of forfeiture, the
buyer's interest in the contract is considered to be real property for
purposes of judgment lien attachment.27  This rule applies
whether or not the state allows forfeiture. Therefore, if, outside of
bankruptcy, creditors would be able to reach the debtor's equity in
the real property subject to an installment land contract, then inside
of bankruptcy, the debtor's equity in the land should be considered
the debtor's property, and thus property of the estate. Conversely,
if the debtor has no equity at all in the property, there is nothing
to which a creditor's lien can attach. However, the contract should
270. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), which "permits states to 'opt out' of the federal exemptions
delineated in the Bankruptcy Code, in favor of their own state created exemptions."
Douglas E. Deutsch, "Exemption Reform: Examining the Proposals," 3 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 207, 209 (1995).
271. 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1133.
274. 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
275. Id. at 188-89.
276. Id. at 190.
277. POWELL, supra note 3, 938.26[31; DUNAWAY, supra note 28, § 10.08[5].
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still be treated as a mortgage, in the interest of certainty at the time
of contract signing.
The Bankruptcy Code will yield to state laws when some
important public interest is at stake. States' rights are respected in
one well-recognized exception to the automatic stay: "The
enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained
in an action . . . to enforce [a state's] police or regulatory power"
is not stayed by the automatic stay.278 Applying this exception,
the court in Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental
Resources79 held that the automatic stay did not prevent
Pennsylvania from seeking an injunction against a mining company
in bankruptcy to correct violations of state environmental laws.
28°
In analyzing the conflict between state laws and the Bankrupt-
cy Code, the court in Penn Terra recognized that, while Congress
has the constitutional prerogative to preempt the states, preemption
"must either be explicit, or compelled due to an unavoidable
conflict between the state law and the federal law."'" As a
result, the Bankruptcy Code preempts state law only where it is
clear that Congress intended that it should do so.
The treatment of installment land contracts in bankruptcy does
not raise a question of federal preemption any more than the
treatment of secured transactions or mortgages does. The Penn
Terra court stated that "[wihere important state law or general
equitable principles protect some public interest, they should not
be overridden by federal legislation unless they are inconsistent
with explicit congressional intent such that the supremacy clause
mandates their supersession."'  It is difficult to argue that the
enhanced remedies given to installment sellers advance a public
interest so important that the remedies should be respected even
when the buyer is in bankruptcy.
The Supreme Court has struck down attempts by states to
frustrate the debtor's right to a fresh start. For instance, in Perez
v. Campbell,2' a state law had the effect of forcing the debtor to
pay a discharged tort judgment after bankruptcy.' The Supreme
278. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5).
279. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 272.
282. Id. at 273.
283. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
284. Id. at 643.
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Court addressed the crucial question of what kind of conflict
between state and federal law is permissible under the Supremacy
Clause.285 In Perez, the debtor had been involved in an automo-
bile accident. 8 6 The Arizona statute at issue in the case provided
for suspension of a driver's license and registration when the driver
had an unpaid judgment against him arising out of an automobile
accident.8 The suspension could continue until the judgment
was paid, and the statute provided that a "discharge in bankruptcy
shall not relieve the judgment debtor from any of the require-
ments of [the statute]."' 8
The debtors in Perez claimed that the Arizona statute was in
direct conflict with the Bankruptcy Act and as such violated the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.89 The state argued that
the law was not one with the primary purpose of debt collection in
contravention of the bankruptcy laws, but rather was one with the
principal purpose of protecting the public from "the use of
automobiles by financially irresponsible persons.",21 The Court,
in ruling for the debtors, stressed that the sole emphasis of the
Arizona law was "one of providing leverage for the collection of
damages from drivers who either admit that they are at fault or are
adjudged negligent,, 29' and as such was in conflict with the
debtor's fresh start.29
The Court held the statute in Perez to be unconstitutional
because it stood as an "obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.,
293
Although the prevention of unsafe driving is an admirable goal, the
Court left to Congress the job of determining which debts survive
bankruptcy.2 94 Indeed, Congress has done exactly that in § 523
of the Code, excepting from discharge 16 categories of debts,
including those for alimony and child support, student loans, and
285. Id. at 644-54.
286. Id. at 638.
287. Id. at 641-42.
288. Perez, 402 U.S. at 641-42.
289. Id. at 643.
290. Id. at 644 (quoting Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 140 (Ariz. 1963)).
291. Id. at 646-47.
292. Id. at 652.
293. Perez, 402 U.S. at 649 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), for the
proper test of a state statute's Constitutionality).
294. Id. at 651-52, 656.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
debts arising from drunk driving accidents.295 The court, in In re
Fox, applied this argument to installment land contracts stating,
"we believe that the significance of state law pales in comparison
with the overriding Bankruptcy Code policy of protecting the
property of debtors' estates." '296 The overriding federal interest
in that case was stated to be the interest in allowing debtors to
keep their homes.
297
Treating installment land contracts as anything other than
mortgages violates the debtor's fresh start. Like the statute in
Perez, any state classification of installment land contracts that
would allow them to be treated as executory contracts and require
them to be paid in full are nothing other than attempts to collect
a debt from the debtor in full. Although some forms of enhanced
remedies are permissible in bankruptcy, the treatment of a secured
loan as an executory contract is not. None of the permissible
enhanced remedies allow collection of a higher amount from the
debtor. A security interest allows payment from the collateral;
298
guarantees 299 and letters of credit30° allow payment from third
parties.
In the context of § 365 of the Code, Congress has expressed an
overriding federal interest in two types of executory contracts,
295. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1994). Although debtors in Chapter 13 receive, overall, a
broader discharge than the debtors in Chapter 7, debts arising out of alimony, child support,
student loans, drunk driving accidents and criminal fines are also non-dischargeable in
Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1994).
296. 83 B.R. 290, 298 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
297. Id. In Fox, had the court ruled the contract subject to § 365, the debtor would have
been required to pay $20,000 for property worth $7,000 in order to keep her home (a
building which consisted of a store and an apartment). The debtor in that case was a single
mother of five who was "desperate for a home for her large family when she entered into
this transaction." Id. at 293. The Fox case illustrates what can happen when two completely
unsophisticated business people attempt to design a real estate transaction.
298. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
299. The automatic stay does not enjoin actions against guarantors. An exception is
made in Chapter 13. Under § 1301(a), actions against codebtors are stayed if the debt is a
consumer debt and the codebtor is not in the business of guaranteeing debt. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1301(a) (1994).
300. Some courts have enjoined payments on letters of credit in bankruptcy. Wysko Inv.
Co. v. Great Am. Bank, 131 B.R. 146 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1991); Prime Motor Inns, Inc. v. First
Fidelity Bank N.A. N.J., 130 B.R. 610 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991); In re Delaware River
Stevedores, Inc., 129 B.R. 38 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991). However, if the independence
principle is respected, a creditor may draw under a letter of credit and the issuing bank
would then have an action against the debtor under the reimbursement agreement. Juliet
M. Moringiello, Silencing the Loose Cannon: The Need for the Bankruptcy Code to Recognize
Letters of Credit, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 619 (1994).
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collective bargaining agreements °1 and installment land contracts
when the debtor is the seller." The Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco,3°3 recognized that labor contracts, although
executory, have a special status, and thus, a stricter standard than
the business judgment rule would be required for rejection."
Afterwards, in the 1984 amendments to the Code, Congress
adopted a stricter standard for rejection of such contracts, one
which takes into account the best interests of the employees.
30 5
In the case of collective bargaining agreements, there is no question
that the contract is an executory one and that § 365 applies.
However, the interest in protecting employees is so strong that
Congress enacted a heightened standard for rejection.
It is somewhat misleading, in addition, to characterize
installment land contracts when the debtor is the vendor as
executory contracts, as § 365(i) does. Congress enacted § 365(i) to
combat what was seen as unfair treatment of the buyers under
installment land contracts when the seller filed for bankruptcy.
3°
When the seller files for bankruptcy, the Code allows the buyer to
remain on the land, continue payments and receive title."°' This
result is the same as would be reached if the installment land
contract were a purchase-money mortgage and the seller were a
mortgagee.' s
If installment land contracts were considered mortgages for
bankruptcy purposes, § 365(i) would be unnecessary. Under § 541
of the Code,3° all of the debtor's rights in property become
property of the estate.310 When the debtor is a mortgagee, the
301. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994). Section 1113 prohibits a court from approving the rejection
of a collective bargaining agreement unless: the trustee (including the debtor in possession)
has made a proposal to the representative of the employees that provides for the necessary
modifications in the employees' benefits and protections in order to permit the reorganiza-
tion of the debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtors and all affected parties are
treated fairly; the authorized representative of the employees has refused to accept the
proposal without good cause; and the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of the
agreement. Id.
302. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i).
303. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
304. Id. at 526.
305. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113.
306. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
307. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i).
308. See In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 62-63 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
309. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).
310. Id.
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lien on the property becomes property of the estate, but the
mortgagor's property interest does not."' As a result, when a
mortgagee files for bankruptcy, the mortgagor remains on the
land.312 Therefore, Congress could have protected nondebtor
buyers under installment land contracts even without making
special provisions for them in § 365(i), by simply treating the
contracts as mortgages.
With the most recent Code amendments, Congress recently
settled one question of state law remedies. Until the Code
amendments of 1994, courts battled with determining the extent of
state-created real property rights in the context of the treatment of
a home mortgage in a Chapter 13 plan.3"3
A debtor in Chapter 13 is permitted to cure and maintain
payments on long-term debts, such as mortgages, but is not
permitted to impair a mortgagee's rights if the mortgage is secured
by real property which is the debtor's residence.314 This provision
protects home mortgagees to a greater extent than other secured
lenders under the Code.315 For years, there was substantial
debate regarding the termination point for the debtor's right of
cure. Should debtors be permitted to cure their mortgages after
mortgagees have exercised the right of acceleration? 316  Should
debtors be permitted to cure mortgages after mortgagees have
commenced foreclosure proceedings?317  Should debtors be
permitted to cure after judgment for foreclosure 318 or even during
postsale statutory redemption periods?319
311. See id.
312. The same analysis applies when the contract is a lease of real property. 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(h). Andrew I, supra note 86, at 904-05.
313. See, e.g., In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370 (3d Cir. 1987); DiPierro v. Taddeo (In re
Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Callahan, 158 B.R. 898 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993);
Thompson v. Great Lakes Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass. (In re Thompson), 17 B.R. 748 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1982); In re Soderlund, 7 B.R. 44 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 18 B.R. 12
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
314. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1994).
315. For background, see Veryl Victoria Miles, The Bifurcation of Undersecured
Residential Mortgages Under § 1322(b) (2) of the Bankruptcy Code: The Final Resolution, 67
AM. BANKR. L.J. 207, 255-68 (1993).
316. See DiPierro, 24 F.2d 685.
317. See Midlantic v. DeSeno (In re DeSeno), 17 F.3d 642 (3d Cir. 1994); Green Tree
Acceptance, Inc. v. Hoggle (In re Hoggle), 12 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 1994).
318. See In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370 (3d Cir. 1987); In re Brown, 75 B.R. 1009 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1987).
319. See In re Roach, 824 F.2d at 1371.
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In In re Roach, the Third Circuit, disagreeing with the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits, ruled that the debtor's right to cure expired
upon the entry of the foreclosure judgment.3" The reasoning of
the Roach court is instructive for its illustration of the relative
reluctance to override the state law creation of property inter-
ests.322  After a judgment of foreclosure in New Jersey, no mort-
gage remains to be cured.3 2 The mortgage merges into the final
judgment of foreclosure and the mortgage contract is extin-
guished.31 The court in Roach found that after the point of
judgment, there were no substantial federal interests that would
justify ignoring the state-created property interests.324
The 1994 Code amendments silenced this debate by providing
that if the mortgagor files for bankruptcy before the property is
sold at a properly conducted foreclosure sale, the mortgagor may
cure the default and maintain payments as part of the reorganiza-
tion plan 2.3' According to the legislative history of the Code
amendments, any contrary result would hinder the debtor's fresh
start.a2  Congress thus felt it necessary to make uniform this
question of mortgage law, so that debtors in all states would be
provided with the same opportunity to cure their mortgages. Here
again, the remedies of creditors differed from state to state, in
some, the creditor could take the land notwithstanding the debtor's
bankruptcy so long as a foreclosure judgment had been entered; in
others, if the bankruptcy intervened between judgment and sale,
the creditor could be paid according to the debtor's plan.
The policy of encouraging reorganizations is explicit in the
Code's legislative history. Under the Act, the treatment of secured
claims was ambiguous. The Code made it clear that undersecured
320. Id. at 1379.
321. Id. at 1374.
322. Id. at 1377.
323. Id.
324. In re Roach, 824 F.2d at 1377-78.
325. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1). Section 1322(c) states:
Notwithstanding subsection (b)(2) and applicable nonbankruptcy law-
(1) a default with respect to, or that gave rise to, a lien on the debtor's
principal residence may be cured under paragraph (3) or (5) of subsection (b)
until such residence is sold at a foreclosure sale that is conducted in
accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Id.
326. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 Section by Section Description, 140 CONG. REC.
H10, 764-71 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (inserted by Rep. Brooks); 140 CONG. REC. E 2204
(daily ed. Oct. 8, 1994) (statement by Rep. Brooks).
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claims were to be bifurcated into secured and unsecured claims.32 7
In the words of one commentator, the change "was to give the
secured creditor the value of its property rights, and to prevent that
creditor from exercising the rights themselves."" Under an
installment land contract, it is the enhanced remedy which gives the
seller a more valuable right (full payment of its entire claim) than
the property right of the mortgagee (full payment of the secured
portion of the claim). Therefore, if the enhanced remedy is not
protected in bankruptcy, the installment seller should receive the
same value as the mortgagee would since the value of the underly-
ing real property is the same. Treating an installment land contract
as a mortgage would thus encourage the debtor/buyer's reorganiza-
tion, by preventing the creditor/seller's exercise of its enhanced
remedy.
VI. The Search for the Right Analogy
Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,329 which
governs the sale of goods, if a seller of goods retains title to the
goods after delivery to the buyer, such retention of title is limited
in effect to the reservation of a security interest.3 0 As a result,
the treatment of installment sales of goods in bankruptcy is settled
and uniform, while of course looking to state law.
Professor Westbrook proposes a "functional approach" to
contracts in bankruptcy which abandons executoriness as a
threshold matter in determining whether § 365 applies. 331  In-
stead, Westbrook urges courts, in determining whether § 365
applies, to search for the "economic function of the agree-
ment. 33 2 Westbrook's functional analysis of contracts is tied to
the concept of the other party's "[ijinterest in the [t]hing itself. 333
The interest in the thing itself is the interest which allows the other
party, the installment seller in the instant analysis, to dominion
over a specific asset or to have priority in the proceeds of the sale
327. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 180 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6141.
328. Margaret Howard, Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: An Essay on Missing the Point,
23 CAP. U. L. REV. 313, 315 (1994).
329. U.C.C. §§ 2-101 to 2-725 (1995).
330. U.C.C. § 2-401 (1995). This rule is echoed in § 1-201(37), which defines the term
"security interest."
331. Westbrook, supra note 5.
332. Id. at 319.
333. Id. at 258.
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of that asset.3" In the sale of goods context, an undelivered
seller has a right to the thing itself, while the delivered seller has
only the right to the value of the thing.
335
In proposing a functional approach to installment land
contracts in bankruptcy, Westbrook compares the seller in an
installment land contract to a secured seller of onions. 336 If the
secured seller has delivered the onions to the buyer, then state law,
upon the buyer's default, and bankruptcy law allow the seller to
recover only the value of the onions.33 On the other hand, if the
seller has not delivered the onions before the bankruptcy filing,
then the seller has the right to the onions themselves. 3 8 As a
result, in order to receive the onions according to the contract of
sale, the debtor should be required to assume the contract and pay
the full contract price under § 365. Under Professor
Westbrook's analysis, in determining how to treat an installment
land contract in bankruptcy, courts should look to whether state
law treats the seller as a delivered' or an undelivered 341 seller.
The problem with this analysis, however, is that under the
usual installment land contract, the property is physically delivered,
the buyer has the right to possess the land and the only right that
the seller has is the right to hold the title until the entire purchase
price is paid. To address the undelivered/delivered distinction
under Article 2 of the U.C.C. is to ignore the fact that the buyer
has the land, and to shift the analysis to remedies, which are
changed in bankruptcy.
The closer analogy would be to "true" leases and leases
intended as security under Article 9 of the UC.C.342 Although
bankruptcy courts apply state law in determining whether such
334. Id.
335. Id. at 319.
336. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 263-268.
337. Id. U.C.C. § 9-504 (1994). Outside of bankruptcy, the delivered seller is entitled
to recover the full purchase price of the onions. However, if the onions bring more than the
purchase price upon resale, the seller must give the surplus to the buyer. Westbrook, supra
note 5, at 319.
338. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 267.
339. Id. at 266.
340. Which would be the case in states that treat an installment land contract like a
mortgage, the seller is entitled to only the value of the land at foreclosure.
341. Which would be the case in states which allow forfeiture in all situations, the seller
is entitled to the land itself.
342. U.C.C. § 1-201 (1995)(setting out the standard by which leases are to be considered
either true leases or security interests).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
leases are in fact security interests, courts have long adhered to the
principle that substance of the transaction should take precedence
over the form. 43 Where personal property is involved, if a lease
is found under the U.C.C. to be an installment sale, it is a secured
sale, and the seller must comply with Article 9 of the U.C.C. to
retain an interest in the property.' Interestingly, while
Westbrook praises the cases addressing the lease/sale distinction as
helpful because of their functional analysis of the economic
purposes of the. agreement, he advocates, in the absence of
Congressional action, a delivered/undelivered analysis under state
law for installment land contracts.
345
The court in In re Pacific Express?4 applied the deliv-
ered/undelivered analysis to a "lease" of personal property.
347
Applying the Countryman definition of executory contract, the
court held that, when the seller has delivered the thing sold, the
contract is no longer executory, because, even if the seller has some
remaining obligations, the failure to fulfill them would not excuse
full payment for the goods.3"1 It is important to note, however,
that the delivery on which the court focused was the physical
delivery of the thing sold, not the delivery of the title.349
343. Pacific Express, Inc. v. Teknekron Infoswitch Corp. (In re Pacific Express), 780 F.2d
1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1986) (addressing the conflict between § 544 and § 365 of the Code).
344. Courts sitting in bankruptcy cases also recognize certain leases of personal property
as disguised secured sales. In answering the question of whether a lease is a true lease or
a lease intended as security, the courts look to state law, reflected in §1-201(37) of the
Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., NYNEX BISC v. Beker Industries Corp. (In re Beker
Industries Corp.), 69 B.R. 937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). In many cases involving the sale of
realty, courts have applied principles from the U.C.C., see, e.g., Kuhn v. Spatial Design, Inc.,
585 A.2d 967 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), even though the U.C.C. does not apply to the
sale or transfer of an interest in real property. U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 2-105, 2-107, 9-104. The
U.C.C. is state, not federal law, and courts applying the U.C.C. in bankruptcy cases are of
course deferring to state law in determining the rights of an installment seller of goods.
However, Article 2 of the U.C.C. has been adopted in every state (except Louisiana);
therefore, the law is uniform. It is also a policy of the U.C.C. drafters to make uniform the
laws of the states. It is therefore relatively easy to look at installment sales of personal
property in bankruptcy cases and say that the court respects state law with regard to
property rights.
345. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 318-19, 321. Professor Westbrook notes that, [pierhaps
there should be a special bankruptcy policy about land-sale contracts, especially in
rehabilitation proceedings." Id. at 321.
346. 780 F.2d 1482
347. Id. at 1487-88.
348. Id. at 1487-88.
349. Id. at 1487.
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Some commentators have suggested that even true leases (for
purposes of Article 9 of the U.C.C.) of certain types of personal
property (specifically equipment) should be treated as security
interests for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.3" The theory
behind such a proposal is that the economic expectations of most
equipment lessors and parties with security interests in equipment
are the same.351 On the other hand, other commentators have
argued forcefully that "rent-to-own" contracts for consumer goods
should be treated as "true" leases for bankruptcy purposes using a
similar argument." 2 Lessors in the rent-to-own business are in
the business of leasing used property. Therefore, the economic
expectation of the lessor is that the property will be returned and
leased again.353
Applying the argument to real estate leases, it is clear that a
true lease of real estate is not analogous to a mortgage because, in
a real estate lease, the lessor expects to regain possession of the
property at the end of the lease term. Since land has a practically
unlimited useful life there is a significant residual interest in the
land at the end of the lease term.3" The argument does work,
however, when mortgages and installment land contracts are
compared. When land is sold by the installment land contract
device, the seller never expects to get the land back; rather, the
seller expects a stream of payment, much like a purchase-money
mortgagee, who also expects a stream of payment.
In 1985, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") attempted to eliminate some of
the differences in treatment between security interests in real
property and security interests in personal property by approving
the Uniform Land Security Interest Act ("ULSIA"). 355  The
ULSIA, which has not been adopted in any state, provides that
350. See generally, Margaret Howard, Equipment Lessors and Secured Parties in
Bankruptcy: An Argument for Coherence, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253 (1991).
351. Id. at 253, 305.
352. Barkley Clark et al., "Rent-to-Own" Agreements in Bankruptcy: Sales or Leases?, 2
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 115 (1994). One proposed version of the bankruptcy code
amendments, which passed the Senate, proposed that rent-to-own contracts be treated as
security devices in bankruptcy. S. 540, 103d Congress, 1st Sess. (1993). The version of the
bill which ultimately passed did not contain that provision.
353. Clark et al., supra note 352, at 124.
354. For a discussion of the difference between a lease and a mortgage, see In re Booth,
19 B.R. 53 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
355. UNIF. LAND SECURrry INTEREST Acr, 7A U.L.A. 225 (Supp. 1995).
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"[ilf a seller's retention of legal title to real estate after the buyer
enters into possession is intended as security, the seller's interest is
a security interest. 3 56 Under ULSIA, as under the U.C.C., the
location of the title to the real property is immaterial.357 One of
the purposes behind ULSIA is the simplification and modernization
of the law of secured real estate transactions, for NCCUSL
recognized that real estate law clings to its ancient, historical roots
and that courts are reluctant to change the rules.
358
VII. Section 365 and Installment Land Contracts: A Bad Fit
The current reliance on the distinction between contracts which
are executory and those which are not is misplaced. This is a point
stressed under Professor Westbrook's functional analysis, under
which it is important to look at the other party's (seller's) rights in
the property subject to the contract.3 59  Bankruptcy policy, in
many areas, exalts substance over form.3" Therefore, the Code
already adequately addresses installment land contracts in its
treatment of secured claims.
The scheme of requiring assumption or rejection of executory
contracts rests on the theory that certain contracts'are beneficial to
the bankrupt's estate. The power to assume or reject dates from
the earliest days of American bankruptcy law.361 The idea was that
the trustee had the power to assume contracts which would result
in a profit to the estate.362 The evil that § 365 is designed to
combat is the situation in which both the debtor and the other
party to the contract have unperformed obligations under the
contract when the debtor files for bankruptcy. If the other party
were merely deemed a creditor, he could be forced to deliver his
performance of the contract and receive in consideration a mere
356. UNIF. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT § 111(25), 7A U.L.A. at 231.
357. UNIF. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT § 202, 7A U.L.A. at 237. Section 202 states,
"[e]ach provision of this [Act] with regard to rights, obligations, and remedies applies
whether title to the collateral is in the debtor, the secured creditor, or a third party." Id.
358. Prefatory note to UNIF. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT, 7A U.L.A. at 222.
359. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 286-87.
360. For instance, payments for alimony and support of a spouse or child of a debtor are
not dischargeable, but not to the extent that "such debt includes a liability designated as
alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony,
maintenance, or support." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B). It is clear that bankruptcy courts can
apply a federal standard in determining whether payments are, in fact, in the nature of
alimony, maintenance, or support.
361. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 365.01 (15th ed. 1995).
362. Id.
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fraction of what he was entitled to under the original contract. The
payment scheme under § 365 allows the other party, if he is
required to perform, to receive in bankruptcy exactly what he
would receive outside of bankruptcy.3" The theory is that it is
better to proceed with the debtor's commercial plans than to freeze
them as of the filing date. This way, the debtor would be entitled
to full contract performance, just as if bankruptcy had not inter-
vened.
It is questionable whether characterizing installment land
contracts as executory is consistent with the purposes underlying
§ 365. Treating an installment land contract as an executory
contract would give the installment seller a clear advantage over a
similarly situated, purchase-money mortgagee. A debtor can, under
a plan of reorganization, cure mortgage defaults and make
payments under the plan.3"
The reason for the assumption/rejection provisions in § 365 is
based on keeping contracts that are beneficial to the estate and
rejecting those that are not. Courts which apply the Countryman
definition in ruling that an installment land contract is executory
under § 365 appear to have lost sight of the explanation for that
definition.3'6 In the words of Professor Williston, "all contracts
to a greater of lesser extent are executory. When they cease to be
so, they cease to be contracts at all.''366  Collier gives a good
example of how all contracts which are not fully performed are to
some extent executory.3 67  Countryman framed his definition in
light of the reason for the trustee's option to assume or reject.
36s
A trustee should only assume a contract when the assumption will
363. Id.
364. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1129, 1222, 1225, 1322, 1325, 1328. See generally
NELSON & WHITMAN TREATISE, supra note 3, §§ 8.14-8.55 (outlining reorganization plans
under Chapters 11, 12, and 13).
365. Michael T. Andrew makes a distinction between executory and nonexecutory
contracts and posits that a definition of executory is necessary to distinguish between those
contracts that the trustee may properly elevate to administrative priority and those that the
trustee may not. If a contract is fully performed, there are no remaining benefits to the
estate, and thus, there is no reason to elevate the payments to administrative priority. See
generally Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to Professor Westbrook,
62 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1991).
366. 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1.19 (4th ed. Lawyers Co-
operative Publishing Co. 1990).
367. 2 COLLIER, supra note 361, § 365.01[2].
368. Countryman, supra note 81, at 450.
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benefit the estate.369 If the only effect of assumption would be to
prejudice other creditors, then § 365 should not apply.370 As this
article has shown, treating installment land contracts as executory
contracts serves primarily to elevate the seller to a higher position
than a similarly situated, purchase-money mortgagee.
Countryman addressed the comparison between purchase-
money mortgages and installment land contracts and saw the
seller's obligation to deliver the deed as material. 37' He contrast-
ed this with the position of the purchase-money mortgagee, who,
in Countryman's opinion, has fully performed "when he has
executed the deed and surrendered possession of the property.
3 72
According to Countryman, once the debtor has received all possible
benefits from the contract, the nondebtor party has only a claim in
the bankruptcy case, and the trustee has no reason to assume the
contract.
373
Countryman thus based his conclusion regarding installment
land contracts in bankruptcy on the assumption that the transfer of
the deed from the seller to the buyer constitutes full benefit.
However, under an installment land contract, once the buyer takes
possession of the land, the buyer is usually required to pay for
taxes, utilities, insurance and maintenance of the property. The
delivery of title should not be considered the moment of full
performance, because in real estate law, as in the law of the sale of
goods, sometimes the location of title is disregarded in determining
the rights of parties with interests in the real estate.374
It is also curious to say, as some courts do, that if a contract is
executory, then it is not a security device. A revolving loan





373. The commentators agree that, when a nondebtor contracting party has fully
rendered the performance to which the debtor is entitled, then the contract is not one which
the trustee can assume or reject under § 365. Countryman, supra note 81, at 451; Westbrook,
supra note 5, at 264; Andrew I, supra note 86, at 890. Such contracts are not covered by
§ 365, because the nondebtor's full performance will give the nondebtor a provable claim in
bankruptcy and the estate would not gain anything by assuming the contract.
374. If a court finds a deed absolute to be a financing device, it will be considered a
mortgage. See supra footnotes 61-65 and accompanying text. When the deed of trust is used
instead of a mortgage, the deed is transferred to a trustee. It would seem then, that posses-
sion is, in some instances, more important than title.
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part of both the lender and the borrower. 75 The court in Booth
recognized this problem and characterized the Countryman
definition as a mere guideline.
76
In some ways, the Code already treats executory contracts and
leases, on the one hand, and security interests, on the other,
identically. Professor John D. Ayer makes this comparison in the
context of leases in bankruptcy.377 If, when the buyer/debtor files
for bankruptcy, the value of the land is greater than the amount
owing on the contract, the buyer gets the benefit of the increase.
This result is the same whether the buyer is a purchaser under an
installment land contract or a mortgagor. If the seller is a secured
creditor, the seller is entitled to the amount owed on the loan.378
Likewise, if the seller is a seller under an installment land contract,
the seller is guaranteed only the amount due under the original
contract.379
However, when the property is worth less than the original
contract price, the mortgagee is entitled to merely the value of the
collateral, while the installment seller is still entitled to the full
contract price. This result is anomalous, because if payment had
been for cash at the outset, the seller of course would not have
been entitled to any benefit of the increase in value of the
property. As compensation for waiting for payment, the seller
under both devices charges an interest rate to the borrower and
reserves to himself the right to take possession of the land upon
default. There seems to be no reason why the two should be
treated differently. Professor Ayer, in his article on leases,
elucidates the anomaly in the distinction between leases and
secured credit.38  While he argues that the two devices serve
375. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2). Section 365(c)(2) prohibits the trustee from assuming or
assigning any executory contract if "such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend
other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or to
issue a security of the debtor." Id. This subsection was incorporated into the Code to
prevent trustees from requiring new advances of money or other property, While permitting
the trustee to continue to use and pay for property already advanced, it does not allow the
demanding of new loans or additional transfers of property under lease commitments. H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 348 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 97-100.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 128-33.
377. John D. Ayer, On the Vacuity of the Sale/Lease Distinction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 667,
694 (1983).
378. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1994).
379. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(i)(2)(A). This will be the result if the trustee accepts the
contract. If the trustee rejects, all of the debtor's equity in the land will be forfeited.
380. Ayer, supra note 377, at 695.
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substantially the same purpose, he reaches no conclusion as to
whether leases should be treated as secured transactions presently
are or vice versa.381
In addition, legislative history to the Code indicates that it was
the intention of Congress to treat installment land contracts as
mortgages. This intent can be found in the legislative history of
§ 502(b)(6) of the Code, which deals with the claim of a lessee
against the debtor-lessor for breach of a lease.31 In distinguish-
ing between "true" leases and leases which constitute disguised
security interests, the legislative history states, "[f]inancing 'leases'
are in substance installment sales or loans. The 'lessors' are
essentially sellers or lenders and should be treated as such for
purposes of the bankruptcy law.'' 31 It is interesting to note that
the history makes no distinction between installment sales and
loans. The legislative history continues by stating that one must
focus on the economic substance of the transaction and not "on the
locus of title" in order to distinguish between a true lease and a
security interest.8"
Proponents of the treatment of installment land contracts as
executory contracts fear the installment land contract's demise as
a purchasing device if installment land contracts are treated as
mortgages in bankruptcy.385 However, those who foresee the
demise of installment land contracts fail to recognize the fact that
not every troubled debtor files for bankruptcy, rather studies have
shown that most people wait entirely too long before seeking the
protection of the bankruptcy laws.
386
At least one commentator criticizes the impulse on the part of
courts, legislators, and writers to balance the substantive goals of
bankruptcy with other areas of law, such as environmental law and
labor law.38 Jackson, in setting forth the limits to what bankrupt-
cy law can do, posits that in its role as a collective debt-collection
381. Id. at 697, 698.
382. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6).
383. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-64 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5849-5850.
384. Id. at 5850. The report, in distinguishing between true leases and financing
transactions, stated "the fact that the lessee assumes and discharges substantially all of the
risks and obligations ordinarily attributed to outright ownership of the property is more
indicative of a financing transaction than a true lease." Id.
385. See text accompanying notes 31-32.
386. SULLIVAN et al., supra note 23, at 21.
387. JACKSON, supra note 257, at 1-3.
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device, bankruptcy law should not create rights... [but] should act
to ensure that the rights that exist are vindicated to the extent
possible.388 In his discussion of Booth, Jackson focuses on the
differences between mortgages and installment land contracts, and
criticizes the Booth court for "substantively recharacterizing the
underlying property right from a contract for deed to a secured
sale."3" The question of whether § 365 applies to installment
land contracts is better answered, however, by looking at the
similarities between installment land contracts and mortgages.
Jackson's complaint about Booth is tied to the fact that the
Booth court balanced installment land contract law against
bankruptcy policy. However, the Booth result can be achieved in
a way consistent with Jackson's view of the proper role of bank-
ruptcy law by focusing on the attributes of an installment land
contract rather than the state law label.3" A court need not find
that installment land contracts conflict with bankruptcy policy to
conclude that such contracts are in fact security devices and should
be so treated in bankruptcy. Rather, by viewing the installment
land contract as an enhanced remedy mortgage, a court can reach
the same result. 91  I
All creditors have their remedies changed somewhat in
bankruptcy. A good example is that of a creditor with an Article
9 security interest. A secured creditor, with a security interest in
personal property, has the right of self-help repossession upon
default, provided that the repossession can be effected without a
breach of the peace.3 92 Failing that, the secured creditor can
bring an action for the amount due.393 If the debtor desires to
redeem the property before it is sold, the debtor must tender the
388. Id. at 22.
389. Id. at 120-21.
390. Id. at 65-66. Jackson applies the same attributes analysis in determining the extent
of estate property. Id. at 94.
391. Professor Margaret Howard makes a similar argument in proposing that equipment
lessors and secured creditors be treated alike in bankruptcy. While she does not claim that
bankruptcy law should "cavalierly disregard state law entitlements," she does question
whether "bankruptcy should follow state law distinctions that may themselves be irrational
because they are not supported by relevant differences." Margaret Howard, Equipment
Lessors and Secured Parties in Bankruptcy: An Argument for Coherence, 48 WASH & LEE
L. REV. 253, 255 (1991).
392. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1995).
393. Id.
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entire amount outstanding on the loan. 4  The creditor has the
option to retain the property in lieu of selling it, in which case, the
creditor could reap the benefit of any increased value of the
property.
395
In bankruptcy, however, the position of that creditor changes.
After a bankruptcy petition has been filed, the secured creditor can
neither attempt self-help repossession nor commence litigation to
collect the debt. Both actions are subject to the automatic stay.
396
If, in a Chapter 7 case, the debtor desires to redeem the property,
under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor must tender only the fair
market value of the property.39 7 It seems, thus, that remedies are
not the type of state-created property rights that bankruptcy courts
must respect under Butner.
Finally, it makes sense to examine the history behind § 365 of
the Code in order to conclude that the executory analysis should
not apply to installment sales of real property. Under the Bank-
rIuptcy Act of 1898, title to the debtor's executory contracts and
leases did not immediately vest in the trustee, but vested only after
adoption by the trustee. The reason for this treatment was that
executory contracts and leases involved future liabilities as well as
rights, and the estate should not be charged with these except when
they were clearly assumed.398 Therefore, the estate would not
automatically become liable on burdensome contracts.
The purpose of the election to assume or reject is to protect
the estate from assuming administrative liabilities when it would
not be advisable to do so.299 Assumption elevates the nondebtor
party to a special priority, an administrative one.' Under an
installment land contract, the buyer receives, at the time it signs the
contract, possession and use of the property, just as if it holds title.
394. U.C.C. § 9-506. Under U.C.C. § 9-506, prior to the time that the secured party
disposes of the collateral, the debtor may "redeem the collateral by tendering fulfillment of
all obligations secured by the collateral, as well as expenses [of sale]," and, if provided for
in the security agreement, attorney's fees. Id.
395. U.C.C. § 9-505. This option does not apply when the collateral is consumer goods
and the debtor has paid sixty percent of the price (in the case of purchase money security
interests) or the loan (in the case of all other security interests). Id. For all other secured
loans, the creditor cannot keep the collateral if the debtor objects.
396. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
397. 11 U.S.C. § 722. This section applies only to tangible personal property intended
primarily for personal, family, or household use.
398. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 361, J 365.01[1].
399. Andrew I, supra note 86, at 866.
400. Id. at 890.
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Therefore, assumption, with the accompanying necessity of full
payment and administrative priority, seems to "confer[] priority for
priority's sake, for the purpose of elevating a claim to administra-
tive status rather than as a means of obtaining some contractualbenefit.",40'
VIII. Conclusion
The application of § 365 to installment land contracts serves to
prefer one type of creditor holding land as security for a debt, the
installment seller, over another, the purchase-money mortgagee,
when the two are in fact similarly situated. Such an application
violates one of the basic principles of bankruptcy law, the equal
treatment of creditors. Although bankruptcy law does, and should,
respect state-created property rights, the distinction that states
make between installment land contracts and mortgages is a
distinction of form rather than substance.
In addition, the debtor's fresh start is an overriding principle
of bankruptcy law. Treating installment land contracts as anything
other than mortgages violates the debtor's right to a fresh start.
Such treatment allows a seller, who often has much greater
bargaining power than the buyer, to contract out of the bankruptcy
power and render the buyer liable for the full purchase price of the
land, regardless of any decrease in value of the land between the
date of signing of the contract and the bankruptcy filing.
Congress enacted § 365(i) of the Code to recognize the fact
that an installment land contract is, functionally, a purchase-money
mortgage. It is time for Congress and the courts to recognize that,
whether the buyer or the seller is in bankruptcy, the installment
land contract is, in reality, a financing device.
401. Id.

